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POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES: FREEDOM OF SPEECH V.




REEDOM of speech is one of the most important rights guaranteed
to all American citizens. Set forth in the First Amendment, the Con-
stitution states "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech."' One of the crucial guarantees allowing the free expression
of diverse and challenging ideas, the right to free speech is under attack at
college campuses throughout the United States. This assault comes in the
form of political correctness, 2 a form of intellectual conformity marked by
enforcement through intimidation, called by some a kind of liberal Mc-
Carthyism. 3 Following are just a few examples of how political correctness
manifests itself on university campuses across the country.
At Brown University, a fraternity sent out invitations for a South of the
Border party, depicting a man sleeping through a siesta under a big som-
brero.4 After a student complained that such an invitation showed insensi-
tivity to Mexicans, the Greek council banned all ethnic theme parties. 5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. One dictionary defines political correctness as an ideology "marked by or adhering to
a typically progressive orthodoxy on issues involving race, gender, sexual affinity or ecology."
Random House Webster's College Dictionary 1050 (1991).
3. Michael Kilian, Warning on Political Correctness, CHI. TRIB., July 31, 1991, at 4.
Lynee Cheney, head of the National Endowment for the Humanities has charged that "the
nation's colleges are falling victim to a liberal McCarthyism in which the political correctness
of curricula and teaching is used to advance social agendas and political causes." Id. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union Director Morton Halperin has commented that he could find "no
cases where universities discipline students for views or opinions on the Left, or for racist
comments against non-minorities." Chester Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression in a
Sea of Freedom," COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17, 21. "[Iun the name of toleration and
diversity, American universities are becoming intolerant, unscholarly and undiverse." Firing
Line Debate, Resolved: Freedom of Thought is in Danger on American Campuses 1 (August
28, 1991) [hereinafter Firing Line Debate] (statement of Michael Kinsley of the New Republic
magazine).
4. Suzanne Fields, Stalked by the SSSP, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 15, 1990, at GI.
5. Id.
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Dining hall employees at Harvard were denounced by the dean for having a
back-to-the-'50s party, apparently because it was politically incorrect to feel
nostalgic about a decade marred by segregation. 6 Little more than a year
after the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that burning the American
flag is a protected form of speech, University of Maryland officials asked
students who were hanging American flags and pro-war banners from their
dormitory windows to take them down. One university official justifying the
action stated that "this is a very diverse community, and what may be inno-
cent to one person may be insulting to another."' 7 In a similar display of the
hypocrisy of political correctness, white demonstrators at a pro-Gulf war
rally at the University of Cincinnati were denounced as racists by the Stu-
dent Senate for taunting Arab students. 8 However, the sole black demon-
strator was spared this label because the official university handbook stated
only whites can be racist. 9 Instead, the black student was termed "Euro-
pean-influenced African." 10 Not limiting its enforcement of political cor-
rectness to demonstrations, the University of Cincinnati also does not allow
the discussion or study of "myths" about Columbus and its Student Senate
has declared the university "a Columbus-myth-free campus.", At New
York University Law School, the moot court board initially selected as an
exercise a case involving the custody rights of a divorced lesbian mother.
The problem was withdrawn after some students complained that making
arguments against custody to the mother would be insensitive to homosexu-
als. 12 During a first year study session at the American University, two law
school students were asked by a professor to leave the class because of their
race. The two students were white and they were told that the review ses-
sion was only open to African-American, Hispanic, and Asian-American
students.' 3 A Harvard criminal law professor was chastised by a women's
group for "insensitivity" for discussing the validity of rape shield laws which
allow inquiry into a rape victim's past.' 4 At Evergreen State College in
Washington, the student editor was suspended from the campus newspaper
for lack of coverage of ethnic and minority issues.' 5 At Southern Methodist
University, the judicial committee recently punished one student for refer-
ring to Martin Luther King, Jr., as a communist and singing We Shall Over-
come in a sarcastic manner. The committee also punished another student
for calling a classmate a Mexican in a derogatory manner, even though the
6. See George Will, Curdled Politics on Campus, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 72.
7. Charles Krauthammer, Annals of Political Correctness, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 8,
1991, at A18.




11. Id. at 26.
12. Thomas Jipping, Education vs. Indoctrination: Does Washington Have a Role in Fight-
ing "PC" on Campus, 1991 Heritage Foundations Reports.
13. Linda Himelstein, White Charge Bias, LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 6.
14. Arlynn Leiver Presser, The Politically Correct Law School, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1991, at 52,
54.
15. DINESH D'SOUZA' ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 145-46 (1991).
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student immediately apologized for any offense the term might have
caused. 16 In early 1987, the UCLA campus paper printed a cartoon sati-
rizing affirmative action. After controversy broke out, UCLA suspended the
editor who allowed the drawing to appear. 17 James Taranto, a student col-
umnist for the Daily Sundial at California State University at Northridge,
wrote an article criticizing university officials at UCLA for censorship. Ta-
ranto was also suspended from his editorial position for publishing contro-
versial material without permission.' 8
At the University of Michigan, a male undergraduate student sent a
message on his computer to a female student observing that some allegations
of date rape were false. School administrators quickly threatened prosecu-
tion of the male student if he continued to express such ideas. A school
official told the male student that the discussion of such ideas "reflects an
insensitive and dangerous attitude toward date rape .... The reality of rape
in our culture is that women rarely make false accusations.... The effect of
your message on the reader is offensive, hostile, and demeaning. University
policy prohibits such acts of discriminatory harassment."' 19 A professor at
the University of California at Santa Barbara noted that the term pet had
become a derogatory name and that the politically correct name urged by
animal rights activists was the term companion animal. When the professor
facetiously stated to her class that some magazine centerfold models, called
Penthouse Pets, would now have to be referred to as Penthouse Companion
Animals, fifteen women promptly filed sexual harassment charges. 20 A
brochure issued by MIT lists as an example of ethnoviolence a student's
perception that his professor rarely calls on any black students and when he
does he asks the black students easy questions.2 1 At a university conference
concerning gender, race and ethnicity, one speaker denounced West Side
Story because it had been produced by a white male who had no authority to
represent the Puerto Rican American experience. After another participant
pointed out that West Side Story was merely a variation of Romeo and Juliet,
a play originally created by a white male who was neither an Italian nor a
citizen of Verona, the speaker denounced Shakespeare as a racist. 22
Colleges and universities across the country have enacted politically cor-
rect speech codes. For example, Smith College warns new arrivals against
lookism, defined as construction of a standard for beauty, and ableism, the
oppression of the differently abled (the handicapped) by the temporarily
16. Id. at 302, n.17.
17. Dirk Johnson, Censoring the Campus News, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1988, at 4A.
18. Id. After the ACLU threatened to sue the California State University on Taranto's
behalf, the school reversed his suspension. Id.
19. Joseph Grano, Free Speech v. the University of Michigan, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Spring
1990, at 13-14.
20. William Safire, On Language: Linguistically Correct, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at 18.
21. John Leo, The Words of the Culture War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 28,
1991, at 31.
22. Richard Shweder, The Crimes of White Maleness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, at 15.
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abled. 23 At the University of Michigan, the student code prohibits the dis-
play of a confederate flag on a student's door or laughing at a joke about
someone in class who stutters.24 The University of Connecticut passed a
student code prohibiting "inappropriately directed laughter, inconsiderate
jokes,. . . and conspicuous exclusion from conversations." 25 At the Univer-
sity of Delaware, students and faculty are told to use the term persons of
African, Asian, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and European descent
rather than "blacks, Asians, Hispanics, Arabs, and whites". 26 In addition,
the University called for the replacement of the terms majority and minority
with the terms target populations and under-represented groups. 27 At the
College of William & Mary, guidelines to nonsexist language stated that the
term "kingpin" should be replaced with "key person" and the phrase "male
chauvinist," apparently now redundant, becomes simply "chauvinist. '28
What has happened to freedom of speech and expression on the university
campus? Do students, faculty members, and school administrators now rate
political correctness over the right to free speech provided by the
Constitution?
The political correctness philosophy posits that because the mere discus-
sion of certain ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups, the expression of
these ideas or viewpoints should not be allowed. 29 The offended group may
consist of a certain racial, political, religious, or gender based association.
Adherents to the political correctness movement lobby to enact coercive stu-
dent speech codes to suppress these prohibited ideas or viewpoints. Accord-
ing to those who espouse politically correct expression, the First
Amendment presents no limit on punishing offenders of these codes. How-
ever, political correctness only requires that certain ideas or viewpoints not
be expressed because some groups require special protection from any dis-
cussion of these harmful or offensive ideas. 30 Only ideas considered politi-
cally correct can remain unchallenged while those outside the politically
23. Edward Lucas, Free Speech Falls to the Campus Thought Police, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 9, 1991, at 13.
24. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
25. Department of Student Affairs, Univ. of Connecticut, Protect Campus Pluralism
(quoted in Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 269 (1991)).
26. Memorandum from the University of Delaware Dean's Office, A Guideline for the
Sensitive Use of Language 1 (1991).
27. Id. at 2.
28. Leo, supra note 8, at 26.
29. Glenn Loury, former professor of political economy at the Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment at Harvard, has stated "the cult of sensitivity has evolved in such a way that particu-
lar substantive issues of vital importance to be discussed cannot be discussed because
particular minorities are exercising power ... to curtail the discussions that their feelings not
be hurt." Firing Line Debate, supra note 3, at 10. "The range of considerations that are
brought into debate are limited by the self-censorship that attends the strenuous and some-
times irrational ... response to certain kinds of positions." Id. at 12.
30. In response to this type of thinking, Alan Keyes, a former assistant secretary of state
and now president of Citizens Against Government Waste, said "To think that I [as a black
man] will ... be told that white folks have the moral character to shrug off insults, and I do
not . . . That is the most insidious, the most insulting, the most racist statement of all!"
Stanford News, Press Release (Mar. 19, 1990) (criticizing Stanford hate speech regulation)
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correct spectrum may be freely challenged. 3' In addition, not all groups are
protected equally by these restrictions. Statements that would offend reli-
gious fundamentalists, pro-Israeli groups, Japanese Americans or white
Europeans are not prohibited because criticizing such groups is considered
politically correct. The political correctness movement espouses the belief
that because certain ideas are considered correct by adherents to the move-
ment, these ideas are above debate.
The rising wave of political correctness on college campuses affects both
(quoted in Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484, 493 (1990)). Another commentator has stated:
One has got to conclude that if the colleges and universities put as much effort
into high-quality instruction, vigorous advising, extra tutoring, summer sessions,
and other supplementary academic services as they do to combating naughty
campus behavior and unkind words . . . they could make a big dent in [the
number of minorities who drop out of college]. But, of course, it is easier to
adopt a behavior code for students than to alter faculty-time allocations and
administrative priorities. Symbolic responses to problems are always quicker
and less burdensome, at least in the short run, than hard work.
Finn, supra note 3, at 22.
31. For example, Becky Thompson, professor of Women's Studies at Brandeis University
begins her course by stating "it is not open to debate whether a white student is racist or a
male student is sexist. He/she simply is." An Inclusive Curriculum: Race, Class and Gender in
Sociological Instruction, American Sociological Association, Patricia Collins and Margaret An-
derson, eds., (1987).
In another one of the many examples of political correctness prohibiting the expression of
politically incorrect ideas while allowing the free expression of those considered politically
correct, a student was physically removed from class to prohibit his questioning of the profes-
sor's viewpoint. Pete Schaub enrolled in a Women's Studies class at the University of Wash-
ington at Seattle. On the first day of class, the professor stated that "the traditional American
family represents a dysfunctional family unit." Students who protested that their families were
functional were shouted down with yells of "denial, denial" by teaching assistants hired by the
professor. When the professor claimed that U.S. statistics showed that lesbians could raise
children better than married couples, Schaub asked after class for the source of this informa-
tion. The professor replied, "Why are you challenging me? Get away from me. Just leave me
alone." A member of the professor's undergraduate circle then told Schaub he was a "chau-
vinist goddamn bastard." The next day, Schaub was banned from class. The professor had
two campus police officers waiting in the hall to escort him away. Timothy Egan, Challenge in
Women's Course Roils Washington U. Campus, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1988; Nicholas David-
son, Who is Pete Schaub?, CHRONICLES, Jan. 1989, at 46-48.
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students32 and faculty.3 3 This current challenge to free speech on the college
campus, historically an institution known for protecting freedom of expres-
sion,34 threatens to severely limit one of the fundamental building blocks of a
well rounded education-the ability to discuss all ideas and evaluate them
critically without preconceived notions of what the correct conclusion
32. The effect of political correctness on students is shown by the enactment of various
restrictive speech codes as well as by the pressure put on students by the university, student
special interest groups, and faculty to conform to a certain ideological viewpoint.
A recent incident at Dartmouth demonstrates that political correctness can be enforced
through other means than by enacting restrictive speech codes. In February 1988, The
Dartmouth Review, a conservative weekly newspaper, published a highly critical review of Wil-
liam S. Cole's course noting his use of foul language in class and his reference to students as
honkies. Harmeet D. Singh, Shanties, Shakespeare, and Sex Kits: Confessions of a Dartmouth
Review Editor, The Heritage Foundation Policy Review, Fall 1989, at 58. Four members of
the Review approached Cole, a black professor, at the conclusion of his music class to invite
him to respond to the review of his class. The confrontation turned into a shouting and push-
ing match between the professor and Review members. After breaking the flash attachment off
a photographer's camera, Cole then ordered the students to leave. Black students charged that
the article and classroom incident were racially motivated; the Review insisted that they were
simply criticizing a professor's teaching ability. Dartmouth filed charges against the students
the next day for harassment, invasion of privacy, and disorderly conduct. No university action
was taken against Cole. A university panel found three students guilty of the charges and for
initiating and secretly recording the "vexation exchange" with Cole. Id. The Review charged
Dartmouth with censorship and reverse discrimination. A New Hampshire state judge or-
dered Dartmouth to reinstate two of the students on the ground that a member of the discipli-
nary panel was shown to be substantially biased and prejudiced against the students. John
Casey, At Dartmouth the Clash of '89, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1989, at 28. A federal court later
dismissed the student's suit against the University. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,
709 F. Supp. 32 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 889 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989).
Later the next semester, Cole's wife Sarah Sully, a French professor at Dartmouth, asked
her students to write, in French, their opinions regarding the dispute between Cole and the
Review. The Privileged Class, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1989, at A24. Most of the class knew
that Sully was Cole's wife and tailored their response in the exam to conform to her partisan
opinion. Singh, at 58. One student who was unaware of the connection wrote an essay in
support of the Review's position. The student received a "D" on the exam, despite his excel-
lent French, because he refused to condemn the Review. Id. Sully declared that she could not
"in good conscience reward an 'A' to someone who is writing racist remarks, no matter how
well it is said." The Privileged Class, at A24. The student appealed the grade and the depart-
ment chairman held Sully's grading of the student to be inappropriate.
33. Although restrictive speech codes are not directed so much at faculty as they are
directed to students, political correctness affects faculty members through the formal and in-
formal pressures to accept and express certain views while avoiding the support or discussion
of others. Like university students, faculty members receive this pressure from the tripartite
coalition of school administrators, student special interest groups, and other faculty members
who are adherents to the political correctness movement. See infra notes 350-95.
34. As one commentator observed:
In the Western world, the university has historically been the locus of the
freest expression to be found anywhere. One might say that the precepts embod-
ied in the First Amendments have applied there with exceptional clarity, and
long before they were vouchsafed in other areas of society .... The campus was
a sanctuary in which knowledge and truth might be pursued-and imparted-
with impunity, no matter how unpopular, distasteful, or politically heterodox
the process might sometimes be.
Finn, supra note 3, at 18. Another commentator has opined that "[m]any high-priced colleges
are not inculcating in students those qualities of critical thought and reflection that are the
essence of a liberal education. Instead university leaders have created a sham community
where serious and honest discussion is frequently drowned out by a combination of sloganeer-
ing, posturing and intimidation." Dinesh D'Souza, Cap and Goon: Facing Up to the New Intol-
erance on Campus, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 7, 1991, at Dl.
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should be. This Comment addresses the impact of political correctness on
college campuses and its demeaning effect on students, faculty, and the insti-
tution of higher learning itself. Part II summarizes the most important justi-
fications given for the right to free speech. Part III explores the basic
constitutional principles protecting the First Amendment right to free ex-
pression and also discusses constitutionally permissible restrictions on this
right. In Part IV, the courts' response to demanding politically correct ex-
pression from university students is discussed in both the public and private
university context. Finally, Part V analyzes the courts' response to political
correctness in the context of university faculty members.
II. WHY HAVE A RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH?
Throughout history, the right to free speech has been justified for many
different reasons. Perhaps the most important reason given for the right to
free speech is to encourage the discovery of truth. 3" This approach begins
with the assumption that any idea might be true; therefore, any suppression
of ideas might cause suppression of the truth. 36 The best means to facilitate
this search for truth is to allow as much speech as possible so that the truth
can be revealed and incorrect assumptions can be disproven.37 John Stuart
Mill emphasized the importance of the right to free speech as a facilitator in
the search for truth.38 Justice Holmes also set forth this truth seeking func-
tion of the right to free speech by stating that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
35. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (free
speech promotes the discovery of truth and the advancement of knowledge). As one commen-
tator has put it:
Speech is the means by which people convey information and ideas, by which
they communicate viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses, which can then
be tested against the speech of others. Through the process of open discussion
we find out what we ourselves think and are then able to compare that with
what others think on the same issues. The end result of this process, we hope, is
that we will arrive at as close an approximation of the truth as we can.
LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA 45 (1986).
36. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. "Those who won our independence believed that...
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discov-
ery and spread of political truth; that without free speech... discussion would be futile." Id.
See also David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restric-
tions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 834 (1991) ("[A]ny idea might be true, and
therefore suppression of ideas might cause the suppression of truth.").
37. Judge Learned Hand stated that the First Amendment "presupposes that right con-
clusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it
our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
38. JOHN MILL, ON LIBERTY 50 (E. Rappaport 1978). Mill articulated four reasons why
freedom of opinion and expression are important. First, if an opinion is not expressed, its truth
or falsity will never be discovered. Second, even if suppressed opinion is false, it may contain
some truth that can only be discovered through open and free discussion. Third, even if an
expressed opinion is completely true, unless it is vigorously and openly debated, the reasons for
its truth will not be understood or accepted. Fourth, without free and open discussion, an idea
is in danger of being merely dogma without the strength to affect character or conduct. Id.
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carried out."' 39 Holmes' premise is that any idea might be true, and there-
fore suppression of ideas might cause the suppression of truth.
Another justification underlying the First Amendment is that freedom of
speech is a necessary prerequisite to democracy and self-governance. 40 Jus-
tice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California41 strongly
asserted that free speech is essential to the survival of a democratic form of
government when he stated:
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. [They decided] that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed reme-
dies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believ-
ing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law- the argument of force in its worst
form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of government majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should
be guaranteed. 42
In addition, some commentators have argued that the fundamental human
dignity of each individual requires that the government not interfere with
the right to freely express one's views and opinions.43
A final but very important justification for the right to free speech is that
freedom of speech is crucial to engendering in our society a tolerance for
diverse and conflicting viewpoints.4 This justification reflects that an im-
portant reason to protect freedom of speech is that it reinforces our society's
commitment to the value of tolerance, and that, by preventing the govern-
39. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (speech relating to democratic self-gov-
ernance is at the core rather than the periphery of First Amendment values); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (speech about matters of public concern are at the "highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
("the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment") (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)
("speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-govern-
ment"); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969) ("The First
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.") New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (freedom of expression on public questions is
guaranteed by the First Amendment); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curium, 474 U.S. 1001 (1986) ("Free speech has been on balance
an ally of those seeking change. Governments that want stasis start by restricting speech....
Without a strong guarantee of freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge what
is."); Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 547-48 (1980)
(In a democracy, "even the most odious ideas must be afforded constitutional protection if the
society is to retain its essential characteristic of popular self-governance.").
41. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
42. Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. See BOLLINGER, supra note 35, at 45; R. Ken Greenawalt, Free Speech Justification,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
44. The free speech principle "involves a special act of carving out one area of social
interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate
a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters." BOLLINGER, supra
note 35, at 107. See McGowan & Tangri, supra note 36, at 835.
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ment from suppressing offensive speech, we will be forced to combat it in our
society. In particular, a university's attempt to use coercive rules to prevent
the free discussion of all ideas in the name of maintaining a certain level of
civility on campus is doomed to failure and will create resentment among
those forced into silence. 45 In addition, neither those permitted to freely
express their ideas nor those coerced into silence have learned the value of
tolerating diverse or conflicting views. Therefore, censoring expression in an
attempt to create civility is likely to make the censored speech more, rather
than less, appealing.4 6 Only by allowing all students the right to freely give
and receive ideas can we teach them the ability to think critically, giving
them the ability to change their own minds and form their own opinions.
Restrictive speech codes, by suppressing or eliminating the need for critical
thought about pressing social issues, undermine even this possibility.
Given these persuasive justifications for the right to free speech, the ques-
tion arises why have so many university and college campuses become ad-
herents to the political correctness philosophy that allows certain viewpoints
and opinions to be prohibited? Although opposed by groups as different and
ideologically diverse as the ACLU, the Heritage Foundation, and the Re-
publican party, enforcement of politically correct thought on the American
college campus is increasingly becoming accepted and adopted at many edu-
cational institutions. Even so, political correctness remains a direct chal-
lenge to the right to free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. 47
45. Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation
of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 936 (1991).
46. Strossen, supra note 30, at 554. "In the context of countering racism on campus, the
strategy of increasing speech-rather than decreasing it-not only would be consistent with
first amendment principles, but also would be more effective in advancing equality goals." Id.
at 555.
47. Sometimes it is even considered politically incorrect to discuss the truth. Timothy
Maguire, then a third-year law student at Georgetown University Law Center, revealed that
the median LSAT score at Georgetown is 43 for whites and 36 for blacks. Georgetown's Law
Weekly published Maguire's article revealing the LSAT discrepancy Maguire discovered while
working in the admissions office. The Georgetown Aftermath, at 5. Although Georgetown
threatened to expel Maguire from law school, prior to this case, Georgetown had never
threatened to impose sanctions for such a breach of confidentiality. Id. In a similar case, Rev.
Robert Drinan, a former liberal Democratic member of the House of Representatives from
Massachusetts, had taught at Georgetown in 1985. While discussing a Supreme Court affirma-
tive action decision during the class, Drinan wrote minority and white students' median aca-
demic averages and their average LSAT scores on the blackboard. Georgetown did not
prosecute Drinan for any breach of confidentiality. Linda Himelstein, It Has Been a
Nightmare, LEGAL TIMES, April 22, 1991, at 12. Maguire's lawyer argued that Georgetown
was guilty of a double standard. Maguire's lawyer also alleged that Maguire's exposure of the
admissions data was protected under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because Maguire
believed he was revealing information that showed discrimination against whites at Ge-
orgetown. Any punishment of Maguire would therefore constitute a retaliatory action for
Maguire's whistleblowing on Georgetown. Anne Kornhauser, More Fallout Over 'Admissions
Apartheid', LEGAL TIMES May 20, 1991, at 10. The disciplinary proceedings against Maguire
ended in a settlement between the two sides where Maguire was allowed to graduate. The
Georgetown Aftermath, STUDENT LAWYER, Oct. 1991, at 5.
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III. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS DIRECTLY CHALLENGES FUNDAMENTAL
FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
Political correctness goes to the heart of the First Amendment. The polit-
ical correctness philosophy states that because discussing certain ideas is of-
fensive to some special groups, these ideas should not be expressed.
Enacting coercive rules to suppress certain types of speech and ideas is per-
missible, and those who break the rules may be severely punished. However,
political correctness only requires that certain ideas not be expressed because
they are offensive to certain selected groups. Only expression considered
politically correct can remain unchallenged while those outside the politi-
cally correct spectrum may be freely challenged. In addition, not all groups
are protected equally by these restrictions. The political correctness move-
ment espouses the belief that because certain ideas are considered correct by
adherents to the movement, these ideas are above debate.
Any inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of the tenets of political
correctness requires an analysis under basic First Amendment concepts.
These concepts, articulated by the Court in many speech related cases, show
which restrictions on speech are valid and which are unconstitutional. The
Court has demonstrated that speech may not be suppressed because of its
offensiveness, content, or mode of expression and the right to free speech is
especially protected in the university environment. 48 Restrictions on speech
that are overbroad, vague, or not the least restrictive means to accomplish a
substantial governmental purpose are unconstitutional. 49
A. Underlying First Amendment Principles
1. Free Speech in the University Context is Especially Protected
In all public universities, a student's right to exercise his freedom of
speech is assured by the First Amendment.50 Thomas Jefferson recognized
this right when, speaking of the university, he said "here we are not afraid to
follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long as reason is
left free to combat it."''5 Neither students nor faculty "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'52
The Court has recognized that the "classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace
of ideas' ,,53 and that students have a "right to receive ideas." a54 One of the
most important purposes of getting a college education is to teach students
48. See e.g. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969).
49. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
50. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981).
51. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196 (1861), quoted in Alvin L. Goldman,
The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 646
(1966).
52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
53. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
54. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (local school boards may not remove
books from school library simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas.").
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to think for themselves. "We value freedom of expression precisely because
it provides a forum for the new, the provocative, the disturbing, and the
unorthodox. Free speech is a barrier to the tyranny of authoritarian or even
majority opinion as to the rightness or wrongness of particular doctrines or
thoughts." 55  Many commentators argue that universities should allow
greater, not less, freedom of expression than is prevalent in society at large. 56
The Court has clearly repudiated the view that "First Amendment protec-
tions should apply with less force on college campuses than in the commu-
nity at large."'57
The Court has also held that no matter how offensive it may be to some
individuals, the expression of certain views on university campuses may not
be suppressed to protect certain individuals from being offended. 58  In
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist. 59 the Court held that in
the high school setting, a school must show that speech regulation is based
on "more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."' 0 In Tinker the Court upheld
the students' rights to wear black armbands to show objection to the Viet-
nam War by characterizing the act as one "closely akin to pure speech."'61
The school could not prohibit the students' expression based on an objection
to the ideas expressed rather than the students' conduct in expressing the
ideas. 62 Additionally, because the students' expression did not materially or
substantially interfere with the educational process, it could not be sup-
pressed. 63 The "undifferentiated fear" stemming from the students' silent
expression of political opinion was not enough "to overcome the right to
55. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 357,
357-58 (1975) [hereinafter Report]; see Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162,
166 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[a] state college or university may not restrict speech or association
simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.").
56. Donald Kagan, Dean of Yale College, stated that:
[U]niversities have a stronger responsibility to defend freedom of speech than
the public at large .... [W]e need to hear every kind of opinion, even the most
offensive kind of opinion in order to arrive at the truth. And it is the special
business of universities to seek the truth. Our standards have to be higher in
defending freedom of speech.
This Week with David Brinkley, (ABC television broadcast, May 5, 1991).
57. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
58. Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (citing
Healy, 408 U.S. at 192-93). The Court held that the student's First Amendment rights were
violated by expulsion from a state university for distributing a campus newspaper containing a
political cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and an article using the
expression "mother-fucker". Id. at 671. See Report, supra note 55, at 359 ("the need for
unfettered freedom, the right to think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and chal-
lenge the unchallengeable" is essential in a university); Jack Schmidt, Freedom of Thought: A
Principle in Peril?, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 1989, at 66 ("On some ... campuses in this
country, values of civility and community have been offered by some as paramount values of
the university, even to the point of superseding freedom of expression. Such a view is wrong in
principle, and, if extended, disastrous to freedom of thought.").
59. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
60. Id. at 509.
61. Id. at 505.




freedom of expression." 64
In Healy v. James65 students attempting to create a local chapter of Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society at a state college were denied recognition as a
campus organization. The Court ruled that the college's disagreement with
the group's philosophy was not a valid reason for denying it recognition.
66
The Court noted that a public university could regulate student speech that
posed a substantial threat of material disruption to the educational pro-
cess. 67 Colleges were not required to tolerate activities by an association
which infringed on campus rules, interrupted classes, or substantially inter-
fered with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 68 The
Court, however, stressed that unpopular views could not be regulated, stat-
ing that "[t]he College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent." 69
The Court has clearly articulated that it will vigilantly and jealously guard
the constitutional right to free speech in colleges and universities. 70 As the
Court stated in Sweezy v. New Hampshire:71
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot yet be made.... Teachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and under-
standing; otherwise civilization will stagnate and die. 72
The possibility of disruption in society caused by expressing one's views is
not enough to overcome the constitutional right to free speech. 73 The Court
has stated that "[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble.... Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk."'74
Students may freely criticize their university, its faculty, or the government
in vigorous and harsh terms. 75 As the Court has long recognized, in our
system of government state schools "may not be enclaves of totalitarianism"
where only governmentally approved views are allowed to be expressed. 76
64. Id. at 508.
65. 408 U.S. at 169.
66. Id. at 187.
67. Id. at 189 (citing Tinker 393 U.S. at 513. See also Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (court refused to prevent principal from prohibit-
ing wearing of "freedom buttons" when the proponents of the buttons had harassed other
students and caused "an unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct, a collision with the
rights of others, an undermining of authority, and a lack of order, discipline, and decorum.)
68. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
69. Id. at 187-88.
70. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
71. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
72. Id. at 250.
73. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
74. Id.
75. Papish, 410 U.S. at 672 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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The Court has recognized the power of colleges and universities to restrict
some types of student expression. "A public university does not violate the
First Amendment when it takes reasonable steps to maintain an atmosphere
conducive to study and learning by designating the time, place, and manner
of verbal and especially nonverbal expression." 7 The Court addressed the
free speech rights of students in Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser.78 In Bethel the
Court held that a high school had the authority to punish a student for mak-
ing a lewd speech at an official school assembly. 79 One justification for the
regulation of the speech was that the student's speech was lewd and sexually-
oriented.80 Another justification was that, regardless of the content of the
speech, it disrupted the high school assembly.8 1 Similarly, in Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeierfcns8 2 the Court held that public school officials did
not violate the First Amendment rights of high school journalism students by
"exercising editorial control over the style and content" of a school sponsored
newspaper, "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns. "83 However, in Hazelwood the Court made it clear that its
decision in Fraser was based on the vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive char-
acter of the student's speech at a school event rather than the likelihood of
such speech causing a material disruption of the educational process.8 4
These allowable restrictions on the student's right to free speech do not
support the attempt to suppress politically incorrect speech. Politically cor-
rect speech regulations do not limit their restraints on free speech to simply
designating reasonable time, place or manner. Most, if not all, of the expres-
sion prohibited by these speech codes pose no threat whatsoever of a mate-
rial disruption to the educational process. The educational process, if it is to
mean anything at all, surely includes the discussion of differing and opposing
views and not simply the teaching of one idea as the unassailable truth. In
fact, the educational process works best when students are allowed to criti-
cally evaluate all possibilities and then to form their own opinion as to what
they believe to be the correct view. In reality, restrictive speech codes are an
attempt by universities to avoid discomfort from the expression of what they
consider to be an unpopular or incorrect viewpoint. The Court has expressly
forbidden public universities from to achieve this end.8 5
Through cases involving the right to free speech on university campuses,
the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to consider the special role a
university plays in our society.8 6 The Court has clearly recognized the value
of the free flow of ideas on college campuses as a tool to educate the students
77. Shelton v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 891 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1989).
78. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
79. Id. at 676.
80. Id. at 678.
81. Id.
82. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
83. Id. at 273.
84. Id. at 271 n.4.
85. See Papish, 410 U.S. 667; Healy, 408 U.S. 169; Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
86. See Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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and allow the development of their ability to think critically.87 The Court
seems to be especially concerned with censorship of unpopular ideas, clearly
repudiating the state's ability to demand conformity and acceptance of ideas
officially approved by the state. Therefore, free speech in the university con-
text will be especially protected and any politically correct speech restric-
tions would most likely be given the most exacting scrutiny in order to
preserve both the students' and faculty's right to free expression.
2. Merely Offensive Expression May Not Be Prohibited
The majority of courts have concluded that even the most deeply offensive
public statements are protected by the First Amendment and therefore can-
not be prohibited solely on grounds of their offensiveness. As Justice
Holmes stated, "it is ... not free thought for those who agree with us, but
freedom for the thought that we hate."8 8 Under our Constitution, "the pub-
lic expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers." 89 Guaranteed to each Ameri-
can citizen is the right to freely criticize the government and its policies, and
this "means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation. ' 9°
There is no such thing as a false idea under the First Amendment.91
Under our Constitution, offensive ideas may be countered with opposing
ideas, not censorship of what may be offensive. 92 In our society every citizen
has an absolute right to freely express his views, even if others find these
views wrong or even hateful. 93  The right to free speech "undoubtedly
means freedom to express views that challenge deep-seated, sacred beliefs
87. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
88. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. Street, 394 U.S. at 592. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)
(offensive statements may be protected "even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred
or ill-will"); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 460-65 (1987) (criticism and insults are constitu-
tionally protected activities); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional
protection"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 85 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The kind of expression at issue here is no doubt objectionable to some, but in fact
does not diminish its protected status."); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (Court recognized
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("it is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) ("[a] State may
not unduly suppress free communications of views, religious or other, under the guise of con-
serving desirable conditions."); Abrams 250 U.S. 616, at 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is re-
quired to save the country.").
90. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944).
91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
92. Id.
93. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328, aff'd per curium, 474
U.S. 1001 (1986).
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and to utter sentiments that may provoke resentment."' 94 The Supreme
Court clearly articulated this view in a recent case dealing with flag burning
when it stated that "virulent ethnic and religious epithets" are among the
types of offensive expression that the government cannot prohibit. 95
In another example of this view, the Court in Cohen v. California96 held
that the public use of offensive epithets as part of a political message was
constitutionally protected expression.97 Cohen was convicted of violating a
California statute which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . .by . . .offensive con-
duct." 98 Cohen violated this statute by wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" into a county courthouse. The Court's first reason for
protecting this speech was that if California's statute were upheld, then such
a statute could be used against a variety of other political speakers as well.99
The Court's second reason for protecting this type of speech was that Co-
hen's form of expression was not completely without value as the state con-
tended.10° Cohen was entitled to use emotionally provocative epithets
because the provocation itself had communicative value.101 After all, "one
man's vulgarity is another man's lyric. Indeed, we think it largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individ-
ual."' 10 2 The Court rejected the state's argument that it could constitution-
ally punish "public utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain
what [it] regard[s] as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic."1
0 3
The Court held that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication
need not meet standards of acceptability."' 04 The Court's ruling in Cohen
seems to clearly deny the state any power to regulate the civility of
speech. 10 5 The Court has also ruled that individuals in public places bear
the burden of averting their attention from expression which they find
offensive. 10
6
In perhaps the clearest example of the impermissibility of restricting
94. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
95. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2410 (1990). See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d at
330 ("Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters' biases-these and many
more influence the culture and shape our socialization .... Yet all is protected as speech,
however insidious. Any other answer leaves the government in control of all of the institutions
of culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are good for us.").
96. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 25. "Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it
is grammatically palatable to the squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general
principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 26.
102. Id. at 25.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. at 25 (quoting Citizens for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)).
105. McGowan & Tangri, supra note 36 at 900.
106. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (ordinance banning movies
showing nudity on drive-in movie screens visible from the street could not be upheld to protect
the sensibilities of involuntary passers-by).
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speech because it is offensive, the court in Collin v. Smith 107 allowed a Nazi
march through Skokie, Illinois, a prominently Jewish neighborhood with
many holocaust survivors, and held that the city's restrictions on the Nazi's
right to march were unconstitutional. 10 8 The court held that the problem
with adopting an exception to the First Amendment for such situations is
that they are "indistinguishable in principle from speech that invites dispute,
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger."' 1 9
It should be clear that a university cannot restrict a student or teacher's
expression of certain ideas merely because the university or certain individu-
als find the ideas offensive. Courts have consistently held that every citizen
has a right to express his ideas, no matter how offensive they may be to
others. Other citizens are free to express their own ideas in order to combat
offensive ideas. In this way the Court has adopted the view that more
speech, not less, is the best way to arrive at the truth. The Court uses this
approach because the government has no criteria to judge what speech is
offensive and should be restricted since much speech is potentially offensive
to at least one individual. Therefore, the political correctness philosophy
cannot rest on the concept that the expression of certain viewpoints can be
silenced merely because they offend certain groups.
3. Free Speech Cannot be Regulated Based on Its Content
The First Amendment prohibits both federal and state governments from
restricting speech because of an objection to the underlying ideas expressed.
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that [the] government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject mat-
ter, or its content."' 0 Any regulation of speech must be content neutral
because the government has no acceptable criteria for distinguishing between
valuable and worthless speech. 11
107. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
108. Id. at 1201.
109. Id. at 1206.
110. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
111. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (striking down part of a statute which
sought to limit speech that brought a foreign government into "public odium or public disre-
pute"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (in
regulating access to a nonpublic forum, government may not distinguish on the basis of view-
point); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) ("a desire ... to
exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas [is] ... plainly
illegitimate" absent a demonstrated compelling state interest); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 648-49 (1984) (government may not discriminate on the basis of the subject matter dis-
cussed); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (striking down the University of Mis-
souri's policy prohibiting religious groups from using campus facilities on grounds that
government may not discriminate on the basis of the subject matter discussed); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 30, 40-43 (1980) (government may not discrimi-
nate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978) ("the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) ("[T]he Constitution protects expression and association
without regard to race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group
which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered."); West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
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The First Amendment's protections prohibit the government from limit-
ing the availability of information to the public.' 1 2 Under the First Amend-
ment, the government may not allow the expression of views which it finds
acceptable while suppressing less favored or more controversial ones."13 The
government also may not select which issues are worth discussion or de-
bate.'4 The government must give all points of view an equal opportunity
to be heard and may not restrict expression based on its content." 5 In Ter-
miniello v. Chicago "16 the Court held that racist public speech which merely
stirs the public to anger and invites dispute was protected under the First
Amendment. "17
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challeng-
ing. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment. . . There is no room under our
Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead
to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups."18
Following the guidelines set forth by the Court, it is clear that the free
expression of both students and faculty cannot be prohibited based on the
content or subject matter of their speech. Any attempt to do so would vio-
late the requirement that any restriction on speech be content neutral. This
approach reflects the Court's position that expressions of opinions or beliefs
cannot be regulated merely because other individuals disagree with these
viewpoints or that these viewpoints are unpopular. Therefore, the political
correctness philosophy cannot attempt to restrict the right to free speech
simply because some ideas or expressions are considered politically
incorrect.
4. Free Speech Cannot be Regulated Based on an Offensive Mode of
Expression
The First Amendment also prohibits the government from restricting
(government cannot "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion"); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d at 325 ("The Constitu-
tion forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents.").
112. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-62 (1988).
113. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 337 U.S. 1.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted). Viewpoint discrimination is proscribed even in regula-
tions that govern non-public forum government property. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S.Ct.
3115, 3121 (1990); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. Viewpoint discrimination is also prohibited in
regulations that protect captive audiences. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
305 (1974); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d at 333.
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speech because of an objection to the offensive mode of expression. Texas v.
Johnson 119 is a recent expression of this concept by the Court. In Johnson,
the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the burning of the American
flag and protected this form of expression under the First Amendment, even
though the conduct was likely to cause serious offense to many individu-
als. 120 "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."' 12 1 The Court
concluded that Johnson's conduct did not fall within any constitutional ex-
ception to free speech and therefore his expression was protected and could
not be prohibited.122 The Court stated that the toleration of offensive ex-
pressions, such as burning the flag, is a sign and source of our society's
strength. 23
To conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols to be
used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter
territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.... In evaluat-
ing these choices [among symbols] under the First Amendment, how
would we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this
unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our own polit-
ical preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that
the First Amendment forbids us to do. 124
The Court dismissed the argument that speech could be suppressed solely
because the views expressed are opposed by many citizens. 125
5. Overbroad Restrictions on Free Expression are Unconstitutional
In order to meet constitutional requirements, any restriction on free
speech must not be overbroad.126 A speech restriction statute found to be
overbroad will be struck down as unconstitutional.127 A statute is overbroad
when it is "designed to burden or punish activities which are not constitu-
tionally protected, but the statute includes within its scope activities which
are protected by the First Amendment."' 28 Even if the speech which is
before the court is not protected by the First Amendment, a court will never-
theless strike down the statute as overbroad if it could also be applied to
prohibit other expressive conduct which is protected by the First Amend-
119. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
120. Id. at 399.
121. Id. at 414.
122. Id. at 409.
123. Id. at 419.
124. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417. See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408 (striking down the Flag
Protection Act of 1989 on First Amendment grounds notwithstanding the government's con-
tention that it had an interest in safeguarding the flag as "the unique and unalloyed symbol of
the Nation" and conceding such conduct was likely to cause serious offense); Cohen, 403 U.S.
15 (protection under the First Amendment for wearing "Fuck the Draft" jacket in
courthouse).
125. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
126. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
127. Id.
128. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 840 (1986).
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ment. 129 When a regulation not only affects the exceptions to free speech
but also constitutionally protected speech, with no provision for severing the
latter unconstitutional application, it is overbroad and void in its entirety. 130
If the challenged provision is substantially overbroad, "the law may not be
enforced against anyone, including the party before the court, until it is nar-
rowed to reach only unprotected activity, whether by legislative action or by
judicial construction or partial invalidation." 131 The Court has stated that a
law may be declared unconstitutional "if it prohibits privileged exercises of
First Amendment rights" even if the law has not yet been used to suppress
such protected expression.' 32
The constitutional doctrine of overbreadth recognizes that "the First
Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or
burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn."1 33
By prohibiting overbroad statutes, the Court protects against the chilling
effect on speech that such statutes would likely cause.'3 4 The Court has
adopted a strict evaluative standard by placing the burden on the govern-
ment to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 35 Courts have
consistently held that "statutes punishing speech or conduct solely on the
grounds that they are unseemly or offensive are unconstitutionally
overbroad." 136
Therefore, if a court finds that a university rule restricting some types of
free expression could be applied to protected forms of speech, the court will
likely invalidate the entire statute as overbroad and unconstitutional. This
result is probably reached even if the rule is not applied to protected speech,
because the rule could be applied to reach constitutionally protected speech.
Because of the importance of the right to free expression, the Court should
closely scrutinize any speech restriction which would have a chilling effect
on constitutionally protected forms of expression. The overbreadth doctrine
undermines any possible validity of politically correct speech codes. Even if
these codes prohibited some types of expression not protected by the First
129. Id.
130. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-65 (1987) (Court invalidated a Houston law
making it "unlawful for any person to assault or strike or in any manner oppose, molest, and
abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty" on overbreadth grounds be-
cause it also forbade citizens from criticizing or insulting police officers which was a constitu-
tionally protected activity); Gooding, 405 U.S. 518 (Court reversed the defendant's conviction
on grounds that a statute prohibiting use of "opprobrious words or abusive language" was
unconstitutionally overbroad and was not confined to fighting words); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (statute prohibiting all types of picketing, peaceful or otherwise, was
void due to overbreadth).
131. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (citing Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
132. Button, 371 U.S. at 432.
133. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611.
134. Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
135. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; see Pico, 457 U.S. at 877 ("the State may not suppress
exposure to ideas... absent sufficient compelling reasons."); Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (govern-
ment may only regulate speech with "narrow specificity").
136. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
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Amendment, these codes also can be applied to suppress constitutionally
protected speech. Therefore, the entire code would probably be unconstitu-
tional due to overbreadth and could not be enforced.
6 Vague Restrictions on Free Expression are Unconstitutional
Another doctrine under which any speech restriction must pass is the void
for vagueness doctrine. The void for vagueness doctrine requires that every
law give notice to all citizens as to what activity is prohibited. 3 7 A statute
will be invalidated for vagueness when a person "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning."' 38
The void for vagueness doctrine requires clear guidelines to govern the
enforcement of a law. The Court has held that legislators must draft statutes
so that potential violators will understand which activities are prohibited
and so that public officials will have explicit standards to follow. 139 In other
words, legislators must draft statutes in such a way that the "ordinary per-
son exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and com-
ply." ' 40 Generally, a court also will conclude that a statute is vague if it fails
to provide an "adequate warning of what activities it proscribes," or if it
"fails to set out 'explicit standards' for those who must apply it.'1' 4 This is
particularly true when the challenged regulation is capable of reaching ex-
pression protected by the First Amendment. 42 The Court strictly enforces
the void for vagueness doctrine in the First Amendment context. 43 With-
out such clear guidelines, those who enforce the law would have discretion
to enforce it on a selective basis.
Finally, because the First Amendment needs breathing space, government
regulation of First Amendment rights must be drawn with "narrow specific-
ity." 44 The regulation must not have a chilling effect on protected forms of
expression 4 5 and a narrowing construction of the regulation must be un-
available before a court will declare it void for vagueness.' 46
7. Allowable Free Speech Restrictions Must be the Least Restrictive Means
for Accomplishing a Substantial Governmental Interest
Even if a speech regulation satisfies all the preceding requirements, it must
also be the least restrictive means of accomplishing a substantial governmen-
tal interest.' 47 As the Court has stated, even if the legislative purpose is a
legitimate one of substantial governmental interest, "that purpose cannot be
137. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601.
138. Id. at 607 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
139. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
140. United States Civil Services Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 579 (1973).
141. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607.
142. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
143. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
144. Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
145. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50.
146. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945).
147. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989).
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pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose."' 148 The Court requires that the legislation use means which are
the least restrictive of free speech. 149 In other words, statutes regulating
First Amendment activities must be narrowly drawn to address only the
specific evil at hand. 150
Any university restriction on free speech would likely be held unconstitu-
tional because it would not be the least restrictive means to accomplish any
substantial governmental interest. A court would likely hold that a univer-
sity's desire to allow only certain ideas to be expressed while suppressing
others is not a substantial governmental interest. Even if a substantial gov-
ernment interest existed, other less restrictive means for accomplishing the
objective are available such as having mandatory classes or seminars where
controversial ideas could be freely discussed and debated without the threat
of punishment.
B. Constitutionally Permissible Restrictions on Free Speech
The Court has ruled that some types of expression can be restricted by the
government.15 1 As the Court stated in Konigsberg v. State Bar:152
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association . . . as
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes.'...
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least
two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is nar-
rower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms
of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the
scope of constitutional protection.... On the other hand, general regu-
latory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dently limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the
type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or
the State to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating
valid governmental interests, a pre-requisite to constitutionality which
has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest
involved. 153
Although it is clear that the First Amendment right to free speech is not
absolute, the exceptions to this important right are few and narrowly
interpreted.
148. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 488.
149. NOWAK, supra note 128 § 16.10 at 848.
150. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611.
151. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56 ("not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance") (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
(1985)); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Not
every type of speech occupies the same position on the scale of values. There is no substantial
public interest in permitting certain kinds of utterances.")
152. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
153. Id. at 49-51.
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1. Clear and Present Danger Exception to Free Speech
The clear and present danger exception to the right of free speech allows
for suppression or punishment of speech advocating unlawful conduct when
that advocacy appears to come too close to triggering the occurrence of the
unlawful conduct. This doctrine was articulated in Schenck v. United
States15 4 when Justice Holmes stated that "[tihe question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."' 155 Speech that cre-
ates an immediately harmful impact or is tantamount to "falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing panic" is not protected. 5 6 Holmes further de-
fined his clear and present danger test in Abrams v. United States 157 where
he stated that the government could only restrict freedom of expression
when there was "present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about." 158
In Dennis v. United States 159 the defendants had been convicted under a
federal act for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the United States
government. The Court considered whether the act was "contrary to all
concepts of a free speech and free press" '16 by applying "the clear and pres-
ent danger [test]."' 16 1 The Court adopted the definition of this test from an
earlier decision in United States v. Dennis 162 which requires that "[i]n each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger."' 163 In applying this test, the Court found that the federal act
was constitutional. 164
This doctrine was again used by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 165
where the Court ruled that speech which causes imminent lawless action is
not protected under the First Amendment.' 66 Government regulation of ex-
pression was permitted when the expression reached the level of "inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."1 67 The Court distinguished between mere advocacy, which the gov-
ernment cannot punish, and inciting a group to violence, which the govern-
ment can permissibly regulate.' 68
After Brandenburg, the Court has strictly interpreted this standard, re-
154. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
155. Id. at 52.
156. Id.
157. 250 U.S. 616.
158. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. 341 U.S. 494, 495-96.
160. Id. at 501.
161. Id. at 505.
162. 183 F.2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1950).
163. 341 U.S. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir. 1950)).
164. Id. at 517.
165. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
166. Id. at 447.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 448-49.
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quiring a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the challenged expression.169  In Hess v. Indiana 170 the police arrested the
defendant, an anti-war demonstrator, for disorderly conduct for shouting
"[w]e'll take the fucking street later [or again]" after police officers had
cleared demonstrators off a street. 71 The Court held that because "at worst,
[defendant's speech] amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal ac-
tion at some indefinite future time," the defendant's expression did not incite
imminent action. 172 Moreover, since the Court stated that the defendant
was not even advocating action as the defendant did not direct his statement
to any specific person in the crowd. 173 Courts have expressed their continu-
ing support for the view that some types of speech may be restricted under
this doctrine. 174
The expression of politically incorrect ideas cannot be prohibited under
the clear and present danger exception because most expression considered
politically incorrect would not incite imminent lawless action and would not
advocate unlawful conduct. 175 Therefore, any restrictive speech code which
attempts to suppress politically incorrect expressions cannot rely on the
clear and present danger exception.
2. Fighting Words Exception to Free Speech
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 176 the Court unanimously upheld the
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for derogatory comments made to a fire
marshall during the course of an arrest. 177 The defendant was charged with
violating a law which provided:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call
him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclama-
tion in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation.178
169. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410-11 (1989).
170. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
171. Id. at 107 (last words of defendant's statement were unclear at trial).
172. Id. at 108.
173. Id. at 108-09.
174. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410. ("We do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a
State to prevent 'imminent lawless action.' "); University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 862
("speech which has the effect of inciting imminent lawless action and which is likely to incite
such action may . . . be lawfully punished."). Nevertheless, courts do not seem inclined to
invoke the clear and present danger exception to restrict speech but instead rely on the fighting
words exception. This may be a result of the early use of the clear and present danger excep-
tion in cases involving allegations of communist activities to overthrow the United States gov-
ernment. After the "Red Scare" and McCarthyism abuses of this century, the clear and
present danger test seems to have a stigma of illegitimacy attached to it. Therefore, courts
seem much more comfortable using the fighting words exception.
175. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852.
176. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 569 (quoting Chapter 378, Section 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire).
The Court stated that the statute had two provisions, the first relating to words or names
addressed to another in a public place and the second relating to noises and exclamations. Id.
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The statute, as construed by the Court, prohibited face-to-face words, in-
cluding fighting words, which were likely to cause an immediate breach of
the peace. 179 The complaint arose when the defendant yelled at the mar-
shall, "[y]ou are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."' 80 The
defendant contended the statute violated his First Amendment right to free
speech. The Court upheld his conviction for making the statements on the
ground that they were fighting words that were not protected by the First
Amendment.'' The Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include. .. 'fighting' words-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value ... that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. '8 2
The Court therefore held that such words are beyond the protections of
the First Amendment's right to free speech and may be prohibited. i8 3 "Re-
sort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punish-
ment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."' 84
However, the Court stressed that "no words [were] forbidden except such as
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
individually, [they are] addressed."' 8 5 The Court held that the law was a
constitutionally permissible restriction on the content of the speech.' 8 6
Decisions following Chaplinsky reveal an effort by the Court to narrow
the holding of that case and recognize the "potential social value" of state-
ments which might fall under Chaplinsky's definition of fighting words.' 8 7
In Terminiello v. Chicago'8 8 the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
prohibiting breaches of the peace on grounds that the statute was vague and
overbroad. 189 Although the Court did not reach the issue of whether the
speech was protected by the First Amendment, Justice Douglas' strong
statement of the extent of permissible speech indicates a recognition that
at 572. The defendant was charged with violation of the first provision of the statute and the
Court limited its consideration to the statute's constitutionality to this provision only. Id.
179. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
180. Id. at 569.
181. Id. at 573.
182. Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted). It must be noted that the first prong of Chaplinsky's
fighting words definition, words "which by their very utterance inflict injury" was dictum.
Strossen, supra note 30, at n. 119.
183. Id.
184. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-310).
185. Id. at 573.
186. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 (2d ed. 1988).
187. NOWAK, supra note 128 § 16.39 at 944.
188. 337 U.S. 1.
189. Id.
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some forms of provocative and challenging speech are protected.' 90
Other cases have also narrowed the fighting words exception by focusing
on the context in which the words are spoken. 19 1  In every case after
Chaplinsky dealing with fighting words, the Court disregarded the dictum in
which the first prong of Chaplinsky's definition was set forth and treated
only those words that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" as
fighting words. Under the Court's current view, the government may consti-
tutionally restrict fighting words only in circumstances where their very ut-
terance almost certainly will lead to an immediate breach of the peace. 192
Therefore, a statute penalizing fighting words is unconstitutional on its face
unless limited to face-to-face insults likely to cause acts of violence by the
addressee in response.' 9 3
A recent example of this view is demonstrated by People v. Dietze 194
where New York's highest court addressed a New York criminal code
prohibiting the use of abusive language spoken with the intent to "harass" or
"annoy" another person. 19 5 In Dietze, the complainant, who was mentally
retarded, was walking on a public street when the defendant called her a
"bitch" and said she would "beat the crap out of [the complainant] some
day."' 19 6 The court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding the statute
unconstitutional for overbreadth. 197 The court observed that calling some-
one a bitch is "abusive." 198 Nevertheless, the defendant's words were consti-
tutionally protected. 199
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. TRIBE, supra note 186, at 850-51; See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132
(1974) (ordinance making it unlawful for any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to use
obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police
while in the actual performance of his duty" as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
such a way as being susceptible of application to constitutionally protected speech was consti-
tutionally overbroad and facially invalid); Hess, 414 U.S. at 107-08 (speaker's statement during
an antiwar protest that "We'll take the fucking street later" was constitutionally protected
since the words were not aimed at anyone in particular); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528 (statute,
which prohibited any person from directing "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending
to cause a breach of the peace" to another person, and which had not been narrowed by the
Georgia courts to apply only to fighting words "which by their very utterance.., tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace" was on its face unconstitutionally vague and overbroad);
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 ("Fuck the Draft" not fighting words because no individual "could
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult"); Bachel-
lar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970) (anti-Vietnam war demonstration in front of an
Army recruiting station, which involved inflammatory posters and an exchange between dem-
onstrators and the public, did not rise to the level of "fighting words").
192. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 699 (1974) (per curiam) (reversing contempt
of court conviction for witness' use of word "chickenshit," since there was no showing that it
posed imminent threat to administration of justice); Hess, 414 U.S. at 107-08 (speaker's state-
ment during an antiwar protest that "We'll take the fucking street later" was constitutionally
protected since the words were not aimed at anyone in particular and there was no showing
that violence was imminent).
193. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523.
194. 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989).
195. Id. at 1167.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1168.
199. Id. The Court stated:
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The Court's limitations on the fighting words doctrine may be summa-
rized as follows:
The offending language (1) must constitute a personally abusive
epithet; (2) must be addressed in a face-to-face manner; (3) must be
directed to a specific individual and be descriptive of that individual;
and (4) must be uttered under such circumstances that the words have a
direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response by the average
recipient. If any of these four elements is absent, the doctrine may not
justifiably be invoked as a rationale for the suppression of the
expression. 2oo
Using its narrow construction of constitutionally permissible prohibitions
upon fighting words, the Court has overturned every single fighting words
conviction that it has reviewed since Chaplinsky.20 1
Under the fighting words exception to free speech, a university may con-
stitutionally restrict certain forms of expression. Some universities, such as
Stanford, have used this approach in designing their student codes. 20 2 Other
Defendant's words do not ... fall within the scope of constitutionally proscrib-
able expression, which is considerably narrower than that of the statute. Speech
is often "abusive"-even vulgar, derisive, and provocative-and yet it is still
protected under the state and federal constitutional guarantees of free expression
unless it is much more than that. Causal conversation may well be "abusive"
and intended to "annoy"; so, too, may be light-hearted banter or the earnest
expression of personal opinion or emotion. But unless speech presents a clear
and present danger of some serious substantive evil, it may neither be forbidden
nor penalized.
At the least, any proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited to words
which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or tend naturally to evoke immedi-
ate violence or other breach of the peace. The Supreme Court has oft reaffirmed
the power of states to prohibit public speech which creates an imminent danger
of violence, and this court has, in the past, found no constitutional infirmity in a
conviction for verbally inciting a riot in disregard of police orders to desist. But
the proscription of [the statute] is not limited to such fighting words. Instead, it
extends to any "abusive" language intended to "annoy," and no fair reading of
the statute's unqualified terms supports or even suggests the constitutionally
necessary limitations on its scope.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. Gard, supra note 40, at 563-64.
201. TRIBE, supra note 186, at 929 n.9; Sherry, supra note 45, at n.2. One could argue that
the fighting words exception is merely a subspecies of the clear and present danger exception.
It is certainly arguable that words which by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace (fighting words exception) would also create a clear and present danger of
bringing about imminent lawless action (clear and present danger exception). Therefore, if the
fighting words exception is met then the clear and present danger exception is also most likely
met.
202. Stanford University prohibits speech that amounts to "discriminatory harassment."
Stanford's student speech code provides that:
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sex-
ual orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults
or stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words on non-verbal signals.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, insulting
or "fighting" words or -non-verbal symbols are those "which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and
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universities have been forced to adopt this approach by the courts.203 The
fighting words exception is very narrow and only allows the prohibition of
certain well defined types of speech. Expressing politically incorrect views
that some find offensive cannot be prohibited using the fighting words
exception.
20 4
3. Low Value Speech Exception to Free Speech
Traditionally, courts have adopted a two-tier analysis when evaluating
content based restrictions on speech.20 5 Speech is classified either as high
value, enjoying the strict scrutiny extended to core political speech, or as low
value, being so utterly worthless that it enjoys no First Amendment protec-
tion at all.20 6 Although the Court has not articulated any precise standard
of review for low value speech, 20 7 the Court has accorded different categories
of speech lower value than core speech and has allowed the government
greater leeway in regulating such speech in order to promote substantial
state interests.20 8 Justice Stevens indicates that speech is of low value and
may be regulated by the government if it intrinsically lacks sufficient social
value to warrant full protection under the First Amendment. 2° 9 The
amount of protection given to low value speech depends on the value as-
signed to the speech by a majority of the Court in a given case. 2 10 In some
cases the Court has adopted a type of intermediate scrutiny where the state
must show that the law serves a substantial rather than a compelling govern-
mental interest and is closely related to the achievement of that interest.21'
In other cases the Court has stated that the state is required to show that "its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
which are commonly understood to convey direct or visceral hatred or contempt
for human beings on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
Stanford University, Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discrimina-
tory Harassment (June 1990).
203. See Wu v. University of Connecticut, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. 1990). After suit was
brought against the University of Connecticut, it amended its student code to only apply to
fighting words. Id.
204. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin System, 774
F.Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Wu, No. H89-649; University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852.
205. See TRIBE, supra note 186, at 928-29.
206. Id.
207. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 n.4 (1987)
(noting that "the Court has articulated quite different standards for different classes of law-
value speech"); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
602-05 (1986) (arguing that there is no precise "low-value" test).
208. Stone, supra note 207, at 47.
209. Philip J. Prygoski, Low-Value Speech: From Young to Fraser, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J.
317, 318 (1987).
210. Id.
211. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-64
(1980) (suggesting that commercial speech may be restricted if the state asserts a "substantial
interest"); FCC, 438 U.S. at 745-50 (finding that the state's interests in promoting the general
well-being of youth and protecting unwilling listeners outweighed the slight social value of
broadcasting foul language); Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (allowing regulations on the location of
adult film theatres because the value of sexually explicit expression is outweighed by the city's
interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods).
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rowly drawn to achieve that end,"' 2 12 and that the harm is both imminent
and extremely likely to occur.2 13
According to one commentator, low value speech may be distinguished
from high value speech on four grounds. 214 The speech must not involve a
matter of public affairs and must have purely noncognitive appeal, the
speaker must have no intent to communicate a message, and the government
may not be acting to suppress speech for constitutionally impermissible rea-
sons. 2 15 Other commentators have suggested the abandonment of the low
value approach entirely. 21 6
The low value speech exception to free speech is never used to prohibit the
freedom to speak one's views or opinions in the university setting. The low
value speech approach provides little support for the suppression of politi-
cally incorrect ideas. In fact, many of the ideas or viewpoints which would
be considered politically incorrect actually have a very high value because
they involve the discussion of issues and problems in our society which need
to be openly discussed and debated without university censorship.
4. Group Libel Exception to Free Speech
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of group libel only
once in its history. In Beauharnais v. Illinois2 17 the Court sustained the
defendant's conviction for distributing racist leaflets.21" The Court upheld
Illinois' power to punish distribution of the leaflets under a group libel stat-
ute prohibiting the dissemination of any publication that "portrays deprav-
ity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed or religion which ...exposes the citizens of any race,
color, creed ,or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots. ' ' 219 The court sustained Beauharnais'
conviction for group libel because his leaflet communicated extreme racial
and religious propaganda in public places and by means calculated to have a
powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was presented. 220
212. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
213. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (since the expression was restricted because of content,
the State's interest in restricting such speech must be examined with the most exacting scru-
tiny); Cornelius 473 U.S. at 800 ("speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn
to achieve that interest"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (requiring the "most exacting scrutiny" of
content-based restrictions); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48 (distinguishing advocacy of vio-
lence in the abstract from speech threatening actual, imminent violence).
214. Sunstein, supra note 207 at 603-04.
215. Id.
216. Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 552 (1989); Prygoski,
supra note 208 at 319.
217. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
218. Id. at 266.
219. Id. at 251 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 471 (1949)). Under this statute,
group libel was defined as the depiction of the "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of
virtue" of any social group, including a race, which holds the group up to public contempt.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
220. Id. at 262.
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The Court cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire221 in support of the view
that group libel was one of the unprotected categories of speech, based on
the state's interest in preventing the breach of the peace that could flow from
such libel. 222 The Court stated that if the leaflet was directed at an individ-
ual, it would clearly be libelous. 223 The Court then went on to say that "if
an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanc-
tions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed
at a defined group. '224 In Beauharnais, the Court seemed to adopt the view
that offensive speech that contained epithets and degrading comments
"which by their very utterance inflict injury" could be prohibited. 225 How-
ever, in Beauharnais the Court seemed to hold that it was not necessary for
the injurious words to incite any breach of the peace since no such breach of
the peace occurred or was alleged in the case.
In his dissent, Justice Black viewed the defendant's actions as merely ex-
pressing an opinion about a matter of public concern and Black rejected the
notion that the government could punish this conduct.226 Justice Black
stated that "no legislature is charged with the duty or vested with the power
to decide what public issues Americans can discuss. In a free country that is
the individual's choice, not the state's. '227 In addition, Justice Black stated
that the only constitutionally recognized form of criminal libel protected in-
dividuals, not huge groups.228 Finally, Justice Black claimed group libel was
merely a sugar-coating on blatant censorship and cautioned any minority
groups who believed this holding was a victory to consider the warning of
the time worn phrase: "a]nother such victory and I am undone. '229
Later developments, however, have caused many courts to question the
continuing validity of group libel under Beauharnais.230 Many commenta-
tors have also reflected their doubts as to whether Beauharnais' group libel
approach is still good law.231 Most importantly, New York Times Co. v.
221. 315 U.S. 568.
222. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
223. Id.
224. Id. The Court again articulated this position by stating "we are precluded from say-
ing that speech concededly punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be
outlawed if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the affiliated individ-
ual may be inextricably involved." Id. at 263.
225. Id. at 256. Under the fighting words exception to free speech, words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" may be prohib-
ited. Id.
226. Id. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 272.
229. Id. at 275.
230. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 82 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that Beauharnais is a
misfit and should be overruled); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d
169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring) (arguing that Beauharnais no longer
reflects the view of the Court's majority); United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78
(D. Md. 1974) (questioning whether Beauharnais is still good law).
231. See, e.g., NOWAK, supra note 128, at § 16.33, at 926 ("Although Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois has never been explicitly rejected, it should not represent present law in light of New York
Times v. Sullivan .. "); Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 284 (concept of group libel is an "anachro-
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Sullivan 232 established that not all libelous speech is beyond the protection
of the First Amendment. This emphasis on falsity led the Court later to
conclude that statements which could not be proven false could not support
an action for defamation.233 In Collin v. Smith 234 the court expressed its
doubts about the continuing viability of the tendency to induce violence
prong of Beauharnais.235 It then questioned Beauharnais' other rationale -
that libel is not constitutionally protected speech - in light of New York
Times and the cases following that decision.236 The court expressly rejected
the argument that group libel could be regulated solely on the basis of its
offensiveness without regard to its likelihood to lead to violence. 237 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that statements
that defame groups convey opinions or ideas on matters of public concern
and therefore should be protected even if those statements are offensive to
some individuals.238 Although the Court declined "to create a wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion," it
stressed that statements would only be actionable in defamation suits if it
was concluded that they imply an assertion of fact.239
The validity of group libel is at best uncertain and has been called into
question by many courts and commentators as a way to restrict free speech.
The Court has made it clear that the government cannot prohibit the expres-
sion of "virulent ethnic and religious epithets" 24° and therefore any state-
ments of opinions or beliefs about certain groups which happen to offend or
are derogatory toward such groups should be protected under the First
Amendment. Any university speech restriction based on the group libel ap-
proach which is designed to prohibit speech merely because it is offensive or
demeaning to a group would most likely be held to be in violation of the
First Amendment.
IV. EFFECT OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON STUDENTS
One manifestation of political correctness' effect on students is found in
the passing of student codes by many universities that restrict the students'
nism"); Lee Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections of an "Easy Case" and Free Speech
Theory, 80 MicH. L. REV. 617, 620 (1982) ("Beauharnais was no longer good law after Bran-
denburg v. Ohio .... ); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZA L. REV.
445, 449 & n.27 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Fer-
ber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 303 & n.100 (1982); Strossen, supra note 30, at n.166 (group
defamation concept has been thoroughly discredited); Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered,
89 YALE L.J. 308, 309 n.7 (1979) (noting widespread doubt as to Beauharnais' continued
validity).
232. 376 U.S. 254.
233. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990) (holding that statements that cannot be proven false are
protected by the First Amendment).
234. 578 F.2d at 1204, cert. denied.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1205.
237. Id. at 1205 & n.15.
238. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2697.
239. Id. at 2705.
240. Eichman, I 10 S. Ct. at 2410.
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right to free speech. Many of these codes are purportedly designed to pre-
vent certain kinds of discriminatory remarks or hate-speech. These restric-
tions on speech do not fall within any of the recognized categories of speech
which may be prohibited, such as speech which represents a clear and pres-
ent danger, fighting words, or low value speech. Additionally, courts have
never recognized that such types of speech may be prohibited; indeed the
opposite is true in that a substantial amount of speech prohibited by these
codes is specifically protected under the First Amendment. Finally, these
restrictive codes reflect the politically correct philosophy of punishing the
expression of certain ideas which are considered by some to be politically
incorrect while leaving the expression of other ideas which may be just as
offensive to other groups completely unrestricted. These unprotected ideas
have the misfortune of being outside the realm of politically correct thought.
A. Court's Response to Politically Correct Speech Codes in the Public
University
1. Doe v. University of Michigan
In 1988 the University of Michigan adopted a Policy on Discrimination
and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University Environment
[Michigan Policy]. 24' Under the Michigan Policy, a student could be sub-
jected to sanctions ranging from a formal reprimand to expulsion from the
University for "[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victim-
izes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or
241. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 856. The rule in full applied to:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an indi-
vidual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran
status, and that:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic ef-
forts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for edu-
cational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical con-
duct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual
orientation where such behavior:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic ef-
forts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for edu-
cational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities.
Id. In August of 1989, the University withdrew section l(c) although the analogous provision
in section 2(c) remained in force. Id.
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Vietnam-era veteran status. ' 24 2 An interpretive guide published in connec-
tion with the policy, but later revoked, gave examples of both sanctionable
conduct and conduct that would make one a harasser. 243 The former cate-
gory included a male student remarking in class that "[w]omen just aren't as
good in this field as men," and students in a dormitory sponsoring a party
and inviting everyone on their floor except for one woman because some
students thought she might be a lesbian. 244 Examples of conduct that would
make one a harasser included telling jokes about gay men or lesbians; dis-
playing a confederate flag on the door of your residence hall; laughing at a
joke about someone in a class who stutters; and making a derogatory com-
ment about a particular person or group's appearance, sexual orientation,
cultural origins, or religious beliefs. 245
A University of Michigan graduate student specializing in biopsychology,
a field of psychology that studies biological bases of individual differences in
personality traits and mental abilities, filed suit against the University claim-
ing that the Michigan Policy violated his right to freedom of speech. He
claimed that his right to freely and openly discuss controversial theories of
biologically based differences between the sexes and races might be sanction-
able under the policy. In its discussion of the student's claim, the court also
noted that on at least three other occasions the University applied the Michi-
gan Policy to prohibit protected speech in the classroom 24 6. In the first case,
the University charged a graduate student with violating the Michigan Pol-
icy by stating in a research class his belief that "homosexuality was a disease
and that he intended to develop a counseling plan for changing gay clients to
straight. '247 For expressing his opinion, the University charged the student
with sex and sexual orientation harassment. A hearing panel later unani-
mously found the student guilty of sexual harassment. In the second case, a
student was charged with violation of the Michigan Policy for reading an
allegedly homophobic limerick during a class public speaking exercise which
ridiculed a well known athlete for his presumed sexual orientation. After
pressure from the school and to avoid punishment under the Michigan Pol-
icy, the student agreed to attend a "gay rap session," write a letter of apol-
ogy to the campus newspaper, and apologize to his class. The third case
took place in a class which was widely regarded as one of the most difficult
for dentistry students. The class had been broken up into smaller sections to
informally discuss anticipated class problems. One student stated that "he
heard that minorities had a difficult time in the course and that he had heard
that they were not treated fairly."' 248 The student heard this allegation from
his roommate, a black dentistry student. The teacher of the class charged
the student with violating the Michigan Policy. The student agreed to write
242. Id. at 856-57.
243. Id. at 858.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 864.
247. Id. at 865.
248. Id. at 866.
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a letter of apology for making the comment without adequately verifying
whether his allegation was true. The court also noted that in another case, a
complaint of anti-semitic harassment was filed by a Jewish student against
another student who suggested that Jews cynically used the Holocaust to
justify Israel's policies toward the Palestinians. Unlike the previous cases,
here the Jewish student was told that the comment was protected speech not
punishable under the Michigan Policy. According to the court, these cases
showed that the University did not exempt statements made in the course of
classroom academic discussions from the sanction of the Michigan Policy. 249
In all these cases, the persuasion used by the University to get students to
accept some punishment was backed up with "the subtle threat that failure
to accept such sanctions might result in a formal hearing. '2 50
In response to the University's argument that the plaintiff lacked standing
to challenge the Michigan Policy, the court ruled that "[t]he ideas discussed
in Doe's field of study bear sufficient similarity to ideas denounced as
'harassing' in the Guide to constitute a realistic and specific threat of prose-
cution. '2 51 The court noted that the drafters of the Michigan Policy "in-
tended that speech need only be offensive to be sanctionable. ' 25 2 The court
held that the University could not "establish an anti-discrimination policy
which had the effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed with
ideas or messages sought to be conveyed. . . .[n]or could the University
proscribe speech simply because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so,
by large numbers of people. ' 253 "[T]he fact that a statement may victimize
or stigmatize an individual does not, in and of itself, strip it of protection
under the accepted First Amendment tests. '25 4
Because the Michigan Policy attempted to regulate constitutionally pro-
tected speech, the court ruled that the policy was unconstitutionally over-
broad both on its face and as applied.255 In addition, the court ruled that the
Michigan Policy was unconstitutionally vague because it was "impossible to
discern any limitation on [the policy's] scope or any conceptual distinction
between protected and unprotected conduct. '256
2. The UMW Post, Inc. v. University of Wisconsin
In 1989, the University of Wisconsin System amended the student con-
duct code to establish a new offense for certain forms of expression under
which students could be expelled or receive other sanctions. 257 Under the
new policy (Wisconsin Policy), "racist or discriminatory comments, epithets
249. Id. at 865.
250. Id. at 866.
251. Id. at 860.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 863. In support for this view the court relied on Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, Hustler
Magazine, 485 U.S. 46, Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, Cohen, 403 U.S. 15, Button, 371 U.S. 415, and
Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1.
254. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
255. Id. at 866.
256. Id. at 867.
257. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1165.
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or other expressive behavior directed at an individual" that intentionally
"demean" the individual's "race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age" and which will "create an in-
timidating, hostile or demeaning" university environment are prohibited. 258
To be regulated under the Wisconsin Policy, a comment, epithet or other
expressive behavior had to be: racist or discriminatory; directed at an indi-
vidual; demeaning to the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual addressed; and
created an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education,
university-related work, or other university-authorized activity. 259 Penalties
for violating the Wisconsin Policy included written reprimand, probation,
suspension or expulsion from the University. 26° The Wisconsin Policy ap-
plied to students wherever they were located, even off campus, and also ap-
258. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2) (June 1989). The Wisconsin Policy in full read
as follows:
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive be-
havior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals,
or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets, other expressive behavior or
physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orien-
tation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals;
and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educa-
tion, university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par. (a) is present shall be determined
by consideration of all relevant circumstances.
(c) In order to illustrate the types of conduct which this subsection is designed
to cover, the following examples are set forth. These examples are not meant to
illustrate the only situations or types of conduct to be covered.
1. A student would be in violation if:
a. He or she intentionally made demeaning remarks to an individual
based on that person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial slurs, or
"jokes"; and
b. His or her purpose in uttering the remarks was to make the educa-
tional environment hostile for the person to whom the demeaning re-
mark was addressed.
2. A student would be in violation if:
a. He or she intentionally placed visual or written material demeaning
the race or sex of an individual in that person's university living quarters
or work area; and
b. His or her purpose was to make the educational environment hostile
for the person in whose quarters or work area the material was placed.
3. A student would be in violation if he or she seriously damaged or
destroyed private property of any member of the university community
or guest because of that person's race, sex, religion, color, creed, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age.
4. A student would not be in violation if, during a class discussion, he
or she expressed a derogatory opinion concerning a racial or ethnic
group. There is no violation, since the student's remark was addressed to
the class as a whole, not to a specific individual. Moreover, on the facts
as stated, there seems no evidence that the student's purpose was to cre-
ate a hostile environment.
Id.
259. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1166.
260. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.02(4).
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plied to student newspapers. 26 1
During the time the Wisconsin Policy was in force, the University prose-
cuted several students for violations of the policy. In one case, the Univer-
sity "found that a student used inappropriate language" when he called
another student Shakazulu. 262 This student was placed on probation, re-
quired to meet with an alcohol abuse counselor and to plan a project with
the University's Center for Education and Cultural Advancement so that he
could become sensitized to the issues of diversity. In a second case, the Uni-
versity punished a student for stating to an Asian-American student that
"[i]t's people like you that's the reason this country is screwed up," that
"[y]ou don't belong here," and that "[w]hites are always getting screwed by
minorities and some day the whites will take over."'263 The student making
the statement was placed on probation for seven months and had to partici-
pate in an alcohol abuse assessment and treatment program. In a third case,
the University disciplined a student for harassing a Turkish-American stu-
dent by impersonating an immigration official and asking for the Turkish-
American student's immigration documents. The student was placed on
probation for eight months. In a fourth case, during a physical altercation a
student allegedly called one University staff member a "piece of shit nigger"
and the other a "South American immigrant. ' 26 The student was sen-
tenced to a seven month suspension. In a fifth case, a student working with
the University's computer system sent a message to an Iranian faculty mem-
ber stating "Death to all Arabs!! Die Islamic scumbags!"265 The student was
formally reprimanded and placed on probation for the remainder of the se-
mester. In a sixth case, a student was required to watch a video on racism
and write an essay and a letter of apology after she called another student a
"fat-ass nigger" during an argument.266 Finally, in a seventh case a male
student yelled at female student "you've got nice tits."'267 The student was
placed on probation for the remainder of his enrollment at the University,
was ordered to refrain from contacting the female student, and was required
to obtain psychological counseling.
The plaintiffs filed suit against the University of Wisconsin alleging that
the Wisconsin Policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vague-
ness. 268 The plaintiffs stated that the policy was an unconstitutional content
based rule which regulated a substantial amount of protected speech, includ-
261. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion at 12, UWM Post, Inc., 774
F. Supp. 1163 [hereinafter Brief].
262. UMW Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1167.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1168.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1168. In support of their claim of overbreadth and vagueness, the plaintiffs
cited one example where the University stated that "it would be very difficult to show that the
term 'redneck' is by itself the equivalent of a discriminatory epithet." Brief, supra note 261, at
45. The plaintiffs cited this as an example of the difficulty of applying the term epithet to
situations which deserved punishment. In another case in which a white student called a black
student "nigger", the University decided the policy had not been violated because the white
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ing offensive epithets directed at political issues which are protected forms of
speech under the First Amendment. 269 The plaintiffs also argued that the
policy prohibited students from expressing opinions and ideas about impor-
tant social issues which also made the policy unconstitutionally broad.
270
The court agreed that the policy was overbroad and in violation of the
plaintiffs' right to free speech and therefore enjoined the University from any
enforcement of the Wisconsin Policy. 271 The court rejected the University's
contention that it could regulate these types of expressions to prevent inter-
ruption of educational activities. 272 The court emphasized that speech pro-
tected under the First Amendment could be prohibited under the Wisconsin
Policy. 273 Under the fighting words exception to free speech, the expression
must incite an immediate breach of the peace. 274 However, under the Wis-
consin Policy no such requirement was necessary. "[S]peech may demean an
individual's characteristics without tending to incite that individual or
others to an immediate breach of the peace." 275 In addition, the court noted
that an "intimidating or demeaning environment is unlikely to incite violent
reaction. ' 276 Because the policy regulated expression regardless of whether
it was likely to provoke a violent response, it covered a substantial number of
situations where no breach of the peace was likely to result. Therefore, the
Wisconsin Policy failed to meet the requirements of the fighting words ex-
ception or any other recognized exception to free speech and was an uncon-
stitutional content based regulation on speech. 277
The Wisconsin Policy was also ruled to be unconstitutionally vague.2 78
The court noted that nothing in the Wisconsin Policy prevented it from
"regulating speech which is intended to convince the listener of the speaker's
discriminatory position. ' 279 Because of this, the policy would prohibit
speech in many situations where students were merely attempting to con-
vince other individuals of their positions. The speech the policy attempted
to suppress would also be protected because of its "emotive function" as well
as its protection of speech on matters of public concern. 280 Speech is pro-
tected under the First Amendment for its emotive function even if it lacks
cognitive value or intellectual support.28 1 The University's claim that the
prohibited speech constituted verbal assault on a listener gave no support to
the suppression of such speech because speech which causes injury is still
student was raised in a neighborhood where it was common for both blacks and whites to refer
to blacks who were not respected as "nigger." Id.
269. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1176.
270. Id. at 1168-69.
271. Id. at 1177.
272. Id. at 1175 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; Healy, 408 U.S. 169; Tinker, 393 U.S. 503).




277. Id. at 1173.
278. Id. at 1177.
279. Id. at 1175.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1178.
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entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 282 The court stated that
the Wisconsin Policy "does as much to hurt diversity on Wisconsin cam-
puses as it does to help it. By establishing content-based restrictions on
speech, the [policy] limits the diversity of ideas among students and thereby
prevents the 'robust exchange of ideas' which intellectually diverse campuses
provide." 28 3
3. Wu v. University of Connecticut
In 1989 the University of Connecticut enacted a student speech code
(Connecticut Policy) which prohibited certain kinds of student expression.
Article VII(4) of the policy as originally adopted prohibited the following:
4. Harassment and/or Intimidation - Conduct causing alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk by: threatening to commit crimes against per-
sons or their property; exhibiting, distributing, posting, or advertising
publicly offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning persons; us-
ing, in a public place, abusive or obscene language or making obscene
gestures; making unwelcomed sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors; making personal slurs or epithets based on race, sex, ethnic ori-
gin, disability, religion or sexual orientation. This also covers harass-
ment or intimidation of persons involved in a University disciplinary
hearing and of persons in authority who are in the process of discharg-
ing their responsibilities. 284
The Connecticut Policy also provided that the "use of derogatory names,
inappropriately directed laughter, inconsiderate jokes, anonymous notes or
phone calls, and conspicuous exclusion from conversations and/or class-
room discussions are examples of harassing behaviors that are prohib-
ited."' 285  The Connecticut Policy listed the "signs" of proscribed
"Harassment, Discrimination and Intolerance," some of which included:
Stereotyping the experiences, background, and skills of individuals.
Treating people differently solely because they are in some way different
from the majority.
Responding to behaviors or situations negatively because of the back-
ground of the participants...
Imitating stereotypes in speech or mannerisms...
Attributing objections to any of the above actions to "hypersensitivity"
of the targeted individual or group.286
Nina Wu, a student of the University, was expelled from University resi-
dences and dining halls after she displayed a poster on her door listing "peo-
ple who are shot on sight" including "preppies, bimbos, men without chest
hair, racists and homos. ' '287 The word homos violated the Connecticut Pol-
282. Id. at 1175.
283. Id. at 1176.
284. Wu, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. 1990).
285. Department of Student Affairs, Univ. of Connecticut, Protect Campus Pluralism
(quoted in Robert Post, supra note 25, at 269.
286. Id.




icy's prohibition against making slurs or epithets based on race, sex, ethnic
origin, religion or sexual orientation. Wu filed suit against the University
claiming that the Connecticut Policy was unconstitutional because it was
overbroad and vague and that the University's action violated the exercise of
her right to free speech.
The lawsuit forced the University to change the Connecticut Policy,
although the University made the changes with apparent reluctance and dis-
tress. 288 The parties entered into a consent decree, approved by the court,
amending the Connecticut Policy to prohibit only narrowly defined "fighting
words. ' 289 The consent decree provided that the University was perma-
nently enjoined from enforcing Article VII(4) of the Connecticut Policy or
any part of it which "interferes with the exercise of First Amendment rights
by the ... student, when the exercise of such rights is unaccompanied by
violence or the imminent threat of violence. '290 The consent decree also
provided that the University would allow Wu to move back into her dormi-
tory room. 29' The Connecticut Policy now appears less likely to be declared
unconstitutional on its face, although it may remain unconstitutional as ap-
plied to student conduct.
4. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University
For the past two years at George Mason University, the Sigma Chi frater-
nity has held an event known as Derby Days.292 Derby Days is a combined
social event and charitable fund raising activity performed by the fraternity.
A traditional event during Derby Days is the "Dress A Sig" contest in which
fraternity members are dressed as caricatures of "ugly women. ' 293 In prepa-
ration for the 1991 Derby Days, the fraternity submitted the Derby Days
program to George Mason University's assistant director of student organi-
zations and programs for approval. The program specifically listed the
"Dress A Sig" contest as one of the events stating: "Dress a SIG contest
288. Rave, Campus SlurAltersA Code Against Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989, at B1, B3.
289. Wu, No. H89-649 (D. Conn. 1990). Article VII (4) as amended now provides that:
4. Harassment and/or Intimidation-Conduct causing alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk by: threatening to commit crimes against persons or their prop-
erty; making unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors. This
also covers harassment or intimidation of persons involved in a University disci-
plinary hearing and of persons in authority who are in the process of discharging
their responsibilities.
The face to face use of "fighting words" by students.., is prohibited. "Fight-
ing words" are those personally abusive epithets which, when directly addressed
to any ordinary person are, in the context used and as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction, whether
or not they actually do so. Such words include, but are not limited to, those
terms widely recognized to be derogatory references to race, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, disability, and other personal characteristics.
Id.
290. Id. at 2-3.
291. Id. at 3.
292. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F.Supp. 792,
793 (E.D. Va. 1991) (order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs).
293. Id.
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(dress coaches like ugly women). ' 29 4 After requiring numerous changes in
the program to be made, the University approved the program. However,
the University made no request for any changes to the Dress A Sig contest.
During the Dress A Sig contest, one of the participants "dressed in black
face, used pillows to represent breasts and buttocks and wore a black wig
with curlers. ' 29 5 Other fraternity members dressed up as other types of
"ugly women."' 296 One week after the contest took place several students
from the University requested that the University impose sanctions on the
fraternity because the contest had "offended them because it perpetuated
racial and sexual stereotypes. ' 29 7 In response to the request, the University
suspended the fraternity for two years. The fraternity brought suit against
the University claiming that their right to free speech had been abridged.
The court agreed that the fraternity's right to free speech had been uncon-
stitutionally restricted and enjoined the University from imposing any disci-
pline on the fraternity as a result of the Dress A Sig contest.298 The court
held that "[o]ne of the fundamental rights secured by the First Amendment
is that of free, uncensored expression, even on matters some may think are
trivial, vulgar or profane. '299 A state university has no right to restrict a
student's First Amendment rights simply because the university believes that
"exposure to a given group's ideas may be somehow harmful to certain stu-
dents. ' '3° ° "Although appropriate time, place and manner restrictions on
free expression are permissible, a state university may not suppress expres-
sion because it finds that expression offensive. '30 1 Here, the University was
attempting to punish the fraternity for certain expressions simply because
the activity was deemed offensive by the University. In this situation, the
University was not regulating conduct but instead was attempting to regu-
late the content of the message conveyed by the contest because the expres-
sion happened to offend certain student groups.30 2 The court held that the
skit was a form of student expression which "demands First Amendment
protection, ' 30 3 and stated that allowing a student organization to express
itself through this sort of activity was "consistent with [the University's]
educational mission in conveying ideas and promoting the free flow and ex-
pression of those ideas."'3° 4 The court suggested to the University that:
[A] more appropriate response to the activities of the fraternity, and one
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Suspended for Skit. Sigma Chi Sues, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, June 6, 1991 at
A10.
297. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity, 773 F.Supp. at 793.
298. Id. at 794.
299. Id. at 793.
300. Id. (citing Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88).
301. Id. at 795.
302. Id. at 794.
303. Id.
304. Id. The court noted that there was no substantial or material disruption of the Uni-
versity's educational mission which would allow it to suppress this form of expression. Id.
(citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d
801 (4th Cir. 1988); Healy, 408 U.S. 169).
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consistent with the First Amendment 'would have been instead to say
to those offended by ... [the] speech that their right to protest that
speech by all peaceable means would be as stringently safeguarded...
as would ... [the] right to engage in it.'3°5
The clear implication by the court is that those who are offended by certain
expressions may not prohibit the expressions but instead are free to express
their own opposing viewpoints.
The court stated that "[tihe First Amendment does not recognize excep-
tions for bigotry, racism, and religious intolerance or ideas or matters some
may deem trivial, vulgar or profane. ' 30 6 Although the University did not
approve of the message expressed by the fraternity's contest, the University
could not discipline the students by infringing on their First Amendment
rights merely because other students found the content of the contest offen-
sive. 30 7 The University was trying to discipline the students based on the
"heckler's veto" which was impermissible and unconstitutional. 30
B. Political Correctness in the Private University
The constitutional guarantees of free speech provided in the First Amend-
ment only restrict the state and federal government from suppressing pro-
tected forms of expression. Included in this group subject to First
Amendment restraints are state actors- entities which represent state au-
thority because of their close connection with the state. State actors, such as
state universities, are also prohibited from suppressing speech protected by
the First Amendment. However, the First Amendment does not apply to
private entities who remain free to restrict speech in ways which would be
held unconstitutional if the action were done by the government or a state
actor. In many cases it is difficult to clearly distinguish between state actors
and private entities, and in such instances the state action doctrine is in-
voked to determine if the acts of an allegedly private entity may be consid-
ered state action and thus subject to constitutional limitations provided by
the First Amendment.
1. State Action Issue
Most of the protections for individual rights and liberties contained in the
Constitution and its amendments apply only to the actions of governmental
entities.309 The safeguards against deprivations of individual rights which
are contained in the text of the Constitution specifically apply only to the
activities of either the federal or state governments. 310 Additionally, any
305. Id. (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1159 (1986)).
306. Id. at 795.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to "private conduct abridging individual
rights.").
310. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (Court extended the First Amend-
ment's prohibitions to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause).
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subdivision of a federal or state government represents government or state
authority to a sufficient degree to invoke constitutional restrictions on its
actions. I
When a legislature, executive officer, or judicial system takes some official
action against an individual, that action is subject to review under the Con-
stitution because the official act of any governmental agency is direct govern-
mental action. 31 2 The "state action" issue only arises when the person or
entity alleged to have violated the Constitution is not acting on behalf of the
government. 31 3 In such a case the person alleged to have violated the consti-
tutional provision will argue that he is incapable of violating the Constitu-
tion because he is not part of the government, giving rise to the question of
whether the state action issue applies.
A state university is a state actor and its conduct involves state action. 31 4
In the public school context, "state action calculated to suppress novel ideas
or concepts is fundamentally antithetical to the values of the First Amend-
ment."' 31 5 It is in the context of the private university that the state action
issue arises. Because private schools are somewhat insulated from the re-
quirements of public schools, private universities remain "free to take posi-
tions which are often impossible or uncomfortable for the State
University." 3 16
The tax-exempt status or government allocation of funds to a private uni-
versity does not by itself create state action.3 17 Courts will also consider
whether the state is so closely involved in regulating a private institution that
it becomes a de facto state school. 31 8 Some judges and commentators have
311. NOWAK, supra note 128, at § 12.3.
312. Id.
313. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (state action depends on
whether "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [can] be fairly attrib-
utable to the State."); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) ("[T]he
inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the
State itself."); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the au-
thority of state law" is state action)..
314. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
315. Pico, 457 U.S. at 880.
316. Spencer, The Courts and the Colleges, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Apr. 1987, at
310.
317. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school's receipt of substantially
all its funds from state did not make it a state actor); Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d
21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977) (Harvard College's acceptance of state financial assistance and regulation
by the state did not "render [Harvard's] activities governmental in nature"); Grafton v. Brook-
lyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (state subsidy, regulation, and requirement that
New York court approve the law school was not state action); Torres v. Puerto Rico Junior
College, 298 F. Supp. 458 (D.P.R. 1969) (federal grants, loans, and scholarships did not make
college's actions state action); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (state financial aid did not make university's actions state action).
318. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195 (1988) (University's imposition of disciplinary sanc-
tions against basketball coach in compliance with NCAA rules and recommendations did not
turn NCAA's otherwise private conduct into state action); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299
(1966) ("Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental poli-
cies or so impregnated with governmental character" that it can be regarded as governmental
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urged that there is state action whenever a private individual's conduct "is
lawful within the state" and that "this is true whether the state has explicitly
authorized the challenged practice or simply allowed it to exist."3 1 9 Courts
have rejected the argument that the conduct of private universities is state
action because of their public function of education. 320 Another type of pub-
lic function argument, which analogizes a college campus to a "company
town," also has failed to provide a basis for state action.32 1
In Furumoto v. Lyman 322 students at Stanford, a private university, were
charged with violating the student code for interrupting a professor's class
with allegations of racism. The students alleged that Stanford had denied
them their right to free speech under the First Amendment. The court held
that Stanford's actions were not state action.3 23 "A finding of general state
action here would require more than an accumulation of the state benefits or
regulations [of the school by the state]." 324 "The State's grant to Stanford of
corporate powers and privileges is not evidence of State control. ' 325 The
court held that even if Stanford was directly subsidized by the state, this
financial aid would not necessitate a finding of State control; "[t]he question
would then be what control did the State obtain over the University. '326
University education as such is not necessarily state action. 327
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, a private university is most
likely not bound by First Amendment limitations in the United States Con-
stitution. Therefore, a private university would not be prohibited solely on
action); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1975) (extent of governmen-
tal regulation is indicative of state action, but state action can exist via a "symbiotic relation-
ship between school and state").
319. Robert J. Glennon & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 230; see Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
at 849-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("When an entity is not only heavily regulated and funded
by the State, but also provides a service that the State is required to provide, there is a very
close nexus with the State. Under these circumstances, it is entirely appropriate to treat the
entity as an arm of the State.").
320. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 ("That a private entity performs a function
which serves the public does not make its acts state action."); Counts v. Voorhees College, 439
F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1971) (rejecting public function doctrine with respect to colleges), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1971); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (public function theory does not warrant expansion of Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (no princi-
ple supports idea that education provided by private university amounts to state action); cf
Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 45, 48 (E.D.Mo. 1970) (Education
by its nature is a public function and therefore "the private university's performance of a
public function could render its actions subject to constitutional restraints.")
321. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (rejecting allegations
that private university took on public character because it was a self-contained community);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (asserting categorical differences between football
field of private university and company town); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498
(D.N.M. 1970) (public patronage of private university school buildings did not create public
function similar to that of company town).
322. 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (memorandum opinion).
323. Id. at 1268.
324. Id. at 1278.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1279.
327. Id.
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First Amendment grounds from enforcing politically correct speech codes
against university students. Whether a private university with academic in-
tegrity and intellectual honesty would want to hide behind the state action
issue to suppress certain types of speech is another matter. Congress has
also begun to consider the validity of speech restrictive student codes. Illi-
nois Representative Henry Hyde has introduced a bill in Congress that
would require private universities to comply with the requirements of the
First Amendment.3 28 House Resolution 1380 was introduced as the "Col-
legiate Speech Protection Act of 1991" on March 12, 1991.329 The bill
would amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide a civil
lawsuit for students at private schools similar to that available under the
Constitution to students at public schools.330 Senator Larry Craig intro-
duced Senate Bill 1484 on July 17, 1991 as the "Freedom of Speech on Cam-
pus Act of 1991" which would amend Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 to withhold federal financial assistance from any
school with a formal disciplinary code that punishes students who utter po-
litically incorrect speech.33 If these types of laws were enacted, private uni-
versities would be prohibited from enforcing political correctness without
regard to the state action issue.
2. State Constitutions
Many state constitutions explicitly provide for the right to free expres-
sion. 332 These state constitutional provisions promote a broad definition of
the right to free speech by expressly providing protection to certain forms of
expression. Unlike the First Amendment which applies to state and federal
governments and sometimes to private entities under the state action doc-
trine, some state constitutions create an affirmative right to expressive free-
dom which applies to both public and private entities in the state. Several
courts have clearly stated that their state constitutions provide for greater
free speech rights than those provided for under the United States
Constitution. 333




332. Thirty-eight states have affirmative free speech provisions set forth in their constitu-
tions. Among these are the ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a); COLO. CONST. art II, § 10;
CONN. CONST. art 1, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, p V; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 11; Ky. CONST. BILL OF
RIGHTS, § 8; LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. CONST. art. 40; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art 3, § 13; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEBR. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art.
I, p 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.D. CONST. art I, § 4; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEx. CONST. art I, § 8; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH.
CONST. art I, § 5; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 20.
333. See, e.g., Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (court affirmed
California Supreme Court's holding that California state constitution provides more expansive
free speech rights than that provided under the First Amendment); Batchelder v. Allied Stores
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In State v. Schmid 334 the court held that Princeton University, a private
institution, violated a nonstudent's expressive rights when it evicted him
from the campus after he distributed political literature. 335 The court indi-
cated that the New Jersey constitution required the University to respect the
free speech rights of the defendant, despite the absence of state action.
Although the defendant's actions were not protected by the First Amend-
ment, they were protected by the New Jersey state constitution. 336 Simi-
larly, in Commonwealth v. Tate337 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that Muhlenberg College, a private entity, infringed on the state constitu-
tional rights of two nonstudents who were distributing pamphlets on the
campus. 338 The court noted that a state constitution may provide more ex-
pansive individual rights and liberties than the United States Constitution
provides. 339 These types of cases stand for the proposition that even private
colleges and universities risk violating state constitutional rights of expres-
sive freedom even though such rights might not be protected under the
United States Constitution, either because the conduct does not fall within
First Amendment protection or because the state action doctrine bars any
application of the First Amendment to the private university.
3. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality of a particu-
lar hate speech ordinance and declared it unconstitutional. In Matter of
R.A. V ,340 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction
under a hate speech ordinance. 341 The ordinance stated that:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appel-
lation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burn-
ing cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 342
The defendant was charged with violating the ordinance for burning a
cross in a black family's yard. The defendant alleged that the ordinance was
Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1983) (Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides broader
speech rights than the United States Constitution); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981) ("We have often independently evaluated our state constitu-
tion and have concluded that it should be applied to confer greater civil liberties than its
federal counterpart..."); see generally W. Freedman, FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY 75-82 (1988) (state protection is frequently broader than that provided by the fed-
eral First Amendment).
334. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980), cert. dismissed sub nom., Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455
U.S. 100 (1982).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 630.
337. 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981).
338. Id. at 1387.
339. Id.
340. 464 N.W.2d 507 (1991), rev'd, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 1192 WL
135564 (U.S. 1992).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 508 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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overbroad on its face because it could be applied to prohibit expression pro-
tected under the First Amendment. On its face, the ordinance could be used
to prohibit protected forms of expression such as flying a Confederate flag,
placing a sign on a door denouncing the government as racist, displaying a
cartoon ridiculing a university's racially preferential admission policies, or
lampooning the Catholic church for its anti-abortion stance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ordinance should be nar-
rowly interpreted to reach only unprotected conduct such as the fighting
words exception for conduct that inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate
violence or the exception for conduct that is likely to incite or produce immi-
nent lawless action. 343 Because the ordinance was not interpreted to reach
protected forms of expression, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
ordinance was not unconstitutionally overbroad. 3"
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance
was facially invalid under the First Amendment because it unconstitution-
ally prohibited speech on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. 345
The Court held "the government may not regulate use based on hostility-
or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed. ' 346 The Court
stated that:
[T]he ordinance applies only to "fighting words" that insult, or provoke
violence, "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." . . .
Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other
ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affilia-
tion, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered.
The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibi-
tions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects .... In its
practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.... But "fighting words"
that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender-asper-
sions upon a person's mother, for example-would seemingly be usable ad
libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. toler-
ance and equality, but could not be used by the speaker's opponents .... St.
Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules. 347 The
Court noted that under the First Amendment, majority preferences cannot
justify the silencing of speech based on its content.348 Finally, the Court
rejected the argument that the ordinance served a compelling interest, stat-
ing that "the only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is
that of displacing the city council's special hostility towards the particular
biases thus singled out. That is precisely what the First Amendment
343. Id. at 510.
344. Id.
345. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 1992 WL 135564, at *3 (U.S. 1992).
346. Id. at *5.
347. Id. at *6-7 (citations omitted).




V. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AFFECTS FACULTY MEMBERS
Political correctness also has an effect on faculty members by the pressure
put on them by the university administration and certain special interest
student groups to accept and express certain views while avoiding the sup-
port or discussion of others. This unhealthy restriction on the learning envi-
ronment is harmful to students in that they are not presented with the full
spectrum of opinions or viewpoints in many subject areas. In turn, students
may feel less willing to express these politically incorrect ideas because of a
perceived "wrongness" with which these views are now endowed.
A. Idea of Academic Freedom
The legal conception of academic freedom is generally stated in terms of
the "four freedoms" of universities. 350 The university has the right "to de-
termine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."'35' "Our Nation
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom [which is] a special
concern of the First Amendment, [and] which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ' 352 As Justice Frankfurter has
stated:
[I]nhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the
case of teachers brings the safeguards of [the First and Fourteenth
Amendments] vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition
upon the free spirit of teachers ... has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to
cultivate and practice .... 353
Courts generally do not characterize the claims of individual professors as
"academic freedom" claims, but instead resolve these claims under a general
First Amendment analysis. 354
B. Response of the Courts
1. Levin v. Harleston
One court's recent attempt to grapple with the political correctness debate
349. Id. at *9.
350. Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234 (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
351. Id. at 263.
352. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577,
586 (1990) (court reaffirmed an "academic-freedom right against governmental attempts to
influence the content of academic speech."); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574
(1968) ("absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment"); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (academic freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the First
Amendment is designed to protect").
353. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
354. McGowan & Tangri, supra note 36, at 910-11.
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demonstrates itself vividly in Levin v. Harleston.355 The court began its dis-
cussion by stating that "[t]his case raises serious constitutional questions
that go to the heart of the current national debate on what has come to be
denominated as 'political correctness' in speech and thought on the cam-
puses of the nation's colleges and universities. ' 356 Professor Levin was a
tenured philosophy professor at the City College of New York (City Col-
lege), a public institution, and was well known for his controversial views on
issues such as racism, feminism, and homosexuality. However, these sub-
jects were not taught in his classes. In fact, in his twenty-two years of teach-
ing, Professor Levin had taught more than 3,000 students and had never had
a complaint from any student for unfair treatment on the basis of race or
sexual orientation.
Professor Levin was the repeated target of protest groups for several years
at City College. 357 A few of the protestors' activities included distributing
pamphlets outside Professor Levin's classes; burning documents attached to
his door; calling him a racist while blocking entry and exit from his class-
room; attaching a letter to his office door stating "[w]e know where you live
you Jewish bastard your time is going to come"; 358 and sending him two
written death threats in his campus mail box. Professor Levin repeatedly
complained of the disturbances to college officials, but no action was taken.
When he met to complain of the protests and inaction of City College, the
college president told him "What do you want me to do? There's academic
freedom issues here. The students have academic freedom as well, and their
academic freedom is protected. ' 359 Although the offending students were
cited for violating City College's student code, the students simply refused to
appear to answer any of the charges. City College did not pursue any disci-
plinary action against the students because it claimed that enforcing the
rules would cause chaos on campus.
Professor Levin was subsequently asked to withdraw from teaching his
required philosophy course because of a feared disruption of class by protes-
tors and because some members of the class might "feel uncomfortable being
taught by one holding such views.''36° City College had never before asked a
professor to withdraw from a class for these reasons; nevertheless, Professor
Levin complied.
Professor Levin resumed teaching his philosophy class the following se-
mester. However, a City College dean sent Professor Levin's incoming stu-
355. 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 1992 LEXIS
13374 (2nd Cir. June 8, 1992).
356. Id. at 897-98 (citations omitted).
357. City College has in effect a policy prohibiting students "from engaging in demonstra-
tions that disrupt or obstruct teaching and research activities." Id. at 903.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 904. At the same meeting, the president also stated to Professor Levin that
"you wrote about affirmative action and it's not surprising that the students would want to ask
you about it." Id. at 906. The president apparently saw no difference between students "ask-
ing" the professor about his views and invading his classroom with shouts from a bullhorn,
forcing class to be dismissed.
360. Id. at 907.
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dents a letter stating that the professor had "expressed controversial
views"3 6' and telling them that a newly opened second section- a so called
shadow section- of his required philosophy course was available with an-
other professor. Never before had City College created such a shadow sec-
tion merely to allow students to avoid taking a class taught by a particular
professor.
The president of City College requested that the College Faculty Senate
appoint a faculty committee to investigate allegations of bias and racism on
campus. The Faculty Senate refused to do so on the grounds that such a
committee would have a chilling effect on the campus. The president there-
after simply appointed the committee himself, staffing it with members who
had previously denounced Professor Levin and who had no academic back-
ground in philosophy. The president later stated to a group of students that
his formation of the committee was in response to their demand that Profes-
sor Levin be fired.
The court held that the school infringed on Professor Levin's right to aca-
demic freedom and that his right to freely express his ideas had been uncon-
stitutionally prohibited.3 62 The court noted that although Professor Levin's
classes were being disrupted in clear violation of City College's regulations,
nothing was done to stop the disruptions. City College's failure to discipline
known student offenders was held to be without any justification. 363 In fact
City College supported the disruptions by "failing to denounce specifically
the disruptions, [and] by failing to affirm unequivocally Professor Levin's
right to teach his classes unimpeded by the appalling behavior of the shout-
361. Id. at 908. The letter read in part:
You may know-and otherwise, I expect would soon learn from sources other
than this letter-that Professor Levin has expressed controversial views on such
issues as race, feminism and homosexuality. Last year the faculty Senate of the
College registered its opposition to written statements by Professor Levin at the
same time upholding his right as a faculty member to express his views without
restraint .... Taking into consideration the rights and sensitivities of all con-
cerned, and wishing to permit informed freedom of choice for students . . . I
have in this instance decided to open a second [section] ...
Id. In response to this letter, forty-three academics from a variety of institutions wrote a letter
to City College which stated in part:
We ... write to convey to you and the entire City College administration our
growing alarm at your increasing encroachments on the academic freedom of
Professor Michael Levin. Your peremptory removal of him from his introduc-
tory classes... and your letter of incitement.., sent to some of his students this
semester, suggesting that they might wish to remove themselves, constitute im-
proper and dangerous precedents. That letter itself admits that neither Profes-
sor Levin's speech, nor conduct in class, nor his grading patterns reflect in any
way his scholarly or social views. If today Professor Levin may be deprived of
his academic freedom because some dislike his views, whose academic freedom
will be safe tomorrow?
Though you may not have intended it, your actions give encouragement to the
Nazi-like tactics of the student thugs who invaded Professor Levin's classroom,
to the dismay and disgust of his own students. Such an outrage bears too close a
resemblance to escape comparison with the beginning of the downfall of the
great German universities some sixty years ago.
Id. at 908-09.
362. Id. at 919.
363. Id. at 917.
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ers, the intimidators and the bullies .... ,,364 By officially condemning Pro-
fessor Levin's views, City College intentionally injured his position as a
tenured member of the faculty and pressured students to avoid his class be-
cause his views did not conform to the views of the College's administra-
tors.365 The court held that City College punished Professor Levin solely in
retaliation for his expressed views and that in so doing the College violated
his constitutional rights to free speech. 366
Professor Levin's expression of his views outside the classroom on such
issues as affirmative action and the relationship between race and test scores
was protected expression under the First Amendment as matters of public
importance which could not be suppressed by City College.367 A claimed
fear that "exposure in the campus environment to Professor Levin's views
might somehow have caused some students harm" was not a constitutional
basis for prohibiting certain forms of expression.3 68 The court noted that
"[a]cademic tenure, if it is to have any meaning at all, must encompass the
right to pursue scholarship wherever it may lead, the freedom to inquire, to
study and to evaluate without the deadening limits of orthodoxy or the cor-
rosive atmosphere of suspicion and distrust .... ,"369 In affirming this deci-
sion in large part, the Second Circuit altered the judgment slightly by
granting Professor Levin a declatory judgment that his right to free speech
had been violated.370 The Second Circuit stated that "[City College's] en-
couragement of the continued erosion in the size of Professor Levin's class if
he does not mend his extracurricular ways is the antithesis of freedom of
expression."' 371 In addition, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision of enjoin City College from creating or maintaining shadow sections
of Professor Levin's classes, because such an expression of ideas was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.3 72
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 918-19.
367. Id. at 921.
368. Id. at 923.
369. Id. at 925.
370. Levin v. Harlston, 1992 LEXIS 13374 (2nd Cir. June 8, 1992). Basically, the Second
Circuit completely affirmed the lower court's judgement, only changing the grant of perma-
nent injunction to a grant of declaratory relief and vacating that part of the judgment ordering
City College to prevent students from protesting Professor Levin's class. Id.
371. Id. at *8.
372. Id. In another case addressing the right of a teacher to express his opinions, the court
in Bishop v. Aronov held that a University of Alabama professor could not interject his reli-
gious views and opinions in a physiology class. 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). The
court also held that the teacher could not schedule optional classes dealing with religion imme-
diately before finals because this might pressure students into attending and adopting the
teacher's beliefs for the examination. Id. at 1076. However, this court explicitly stated that
with regard to his religious views, the teacher could "express them, on his own time, far and
wide and to whomever will listen; or write and publish, no doubt authoritatively, on them."
Id. In addition, the University could not prohibit the teacher from organizing religious meet-




2. Dube v. The State University of New York
In Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 37 3 a university professor claimed vio-
lation of his First Amendment rights for the denial of tenure based on his
discussion of controversial topics in class. The professor taught a course in
the Africana Studies Program called "The Politics of Race." A course de-
scription made reference to three types of racism citing Nazism in Germany,
apartheid in South Africa, and Zionism in Israel. After complaints arose
about the inclusion of zionism as a form of racism, the professor's course
was removed from the course listings of the political science department.
Subsequently, the professor was denied tenure at the University and his em-
ployment there was terminated.
The professor filed suit alleging that his denial of tenure and of continued
employment was due to his discussion of controversial issues in his class and
that this denial was a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech.
The court denied the University's motion for summary judgment and held
that the professor had presented enough evidence that a jury could find that
he was denied tenure and promotion in response to pressure exerted by
school officials and community activists outraged by his teachings. 374 This
decision allowed the professor's First Amendment claim to go to trial. 375
The court stated that the university had no power or right to deny tenure in
retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights.3 76 At trial, the Uni-
versity would have to show that the professor was denied tenure and promo-
tion for "permissible academic reasons, without regard to community
pressure triggered by [the professor's] teaching on Zionism and racism, and
that the controversy resulting from that teaching did not affect the outcome
of the decision regarding tenure and promotion.' 377
3. DiBona v. Matthews
In DiBona v. Matthews,378 the court held that the cancellation of a college
drama teacher's class constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights.
DiBona, a college drama teacher, had chosen a play called "Split Second" to
use in his teaching of a drama class which required students to produce and
perform the play. The play concerned a black police officer who, while ar-
resting a white suspect, was subjected to many racial slurs and epithets. The
police officer loses control for a brief moment and kills the suspect, planting
a knife in the suspect's hands and claiming self-defense in the shooting.
The college had no requirement that teachers obtain approval of plays to
be performed in class. However, DiBona discussed the play's content with
Matthews, the college president. Matthews canceled DiBona's class because
there was opposition to the play from certain religious groups, concern re-
373. 900 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
374. Id. at 597.
375. Id. at 598.
376. Id. at 587.
377. Id. at 598.
378. 269 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 557 (1990).
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garding the sensitivity of the subject matter from the community, and a be-
lief by some college administrators that the play's language was
inappropriate. Matthews also refused DiBona's request to allow the play to
be performed privately so that students could receive credit for work already
done in the class. DiBona brought suit alleging violation of his constitu-
tional right to free expression.
The court agreed that the college violated DiBona's right to free expres-
sion. The court noted that "[t]he facts of this case present a classic illustra-
tion of 'undifferentiated fear' of disturbance on the part of school
administrators. '379 Neither the clear and present danger test nor the test of
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school" were met which would allow
some restrictions on DiBona's free expression.380 Instead, school officials
were merely concerned with "avoid[ing] the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany" unpopular or unorthodox points of view. 38' The
fact that the play was offensive to certain religious groups and that the com-
munity might be upset with its content were constitutionally inappropriate
reasons for censoring the play.382
4. The University of Delaware
In an arbitration between the University of Delaware and one of its
professors, the arbitrator ruled that the University wrongly and unfairly de-
nied a professor's research funding solely because of the University's disa-
greement with the content of her research.3 83 The professor's primary focus
in her research involved "the societal consequences of differences of ability
between groups and individuals. '38 4 The professor had received several
grants from the Pioneer Fund, an organization established to fund research
into the problems of heredity and eugenics. The professor's work sponsored
by the Pioneer Fund included research into the relationship between general
intelligence and education, intelligence quotient and crime, the merits of ob-
jective tests for hiring workers, and the relationship between ability differ-
ences and educational policy. Some faculty members questioned the
propriety of the University's ongoing relationship with the Pioneer Fund in
light of the University's stated commitment to racial and cultural diversity,
with one faculty member alleging that the Pioneer Fund was "an organiza-
tion with a long and continuous history of supporting racism, anti-Semitism,
379. Id. at 890.
380. Id. at 891 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 891; see also Brown v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674,
679 (D. Neb. 1986) (cancellation of film by University violated the constitutional rights of
persons wishing to view it "because action taken by an arm of the state merely to avoid contro-
versy from the expression of ideas is an insufficient basis for interfering with the right to re-
ceive information.").
383. Univ. of Delaware Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Univ. of Dela-
ware, AAA Case No. 14 390 1935 90 A (1991) (Strongin, Arb.).
384. Id. at 2.
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
and other discriminatory practices. ' 385 The University president created a
committee to consider whether the University should allow the Pioneer
Fund to continue to support the professor's research. The committee con-
cluded that "the Pioneer Fund is committed to the proposition that people
of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds are on the basis of their heredity
inherently unequal and can never be expected to behave or perform equally.
According to this view, which the activities of the Fund propagate, affirma-
tive action plans are unjust and doomed to failure, and should be aban-
doned. ' 386 The committee found this incompatible with the University's
goal of diversity and its support of affirmative action. The University presi-
dent accepted the committee's recommendation that the University not ac-
cept support from the Pioneer Fund.
The professor later tried to apply for research grants from the Pioneer
Fund. The University refused to process the application, causing the profes-
sor to be unable to get the needed funds for research. The professor charged
that the University's refusal to allow her to receive funding violated her right
to academic freedom provided under an employment agreement with the
University. Part of the agreement dealing with academic freedom provided
that "[t]he teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publica-
tion of results. ",387 The professor contended that her right to academic free-
dom precluded the University from banning the source of her research funds
on "political or ideological" grounds.388 Even if the University was not de-
liberately attempting to suppress her research, the ban on all support from
the Pioneer Fund was for all practical purposes a suppression of her research
on ideological grounds thereby violating her right to academic freedom in
her research.
The arbitrator stated that it was clear that the University's decision to
deny the professor's requests for research grants from the Pioneer Fund was
based essentially upon the committee's report. 389 The arbitrator further
stated that the committee violated its own standards of review by looking to
the content of the professor's research. 390 Any restrictions on a faculty
member's academic freedom were required to be fair, reasonable, and consis-
tent.391 Here the restriction on the professor's academic freedom did not
meet these requirements since the committee recommended to refuse fund-
ing based on the content of the research. The arbitrator held that the profes-
sor had a right to academic freedom and that public perceptions alone did
not suffice to overcome this right. 392 The University's commitment to racial
and cultural diversity was an essential part of, and not a rival in conflict
with, the University's commitment to academic freedom. 393 The arbitrator
385. Id. at 3.
386. Id. at 4-5.
387. Id. at I (underscoring in original).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 10.
390. Id. at I].
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therefore ruled that the University unfairly and wrongly denied the profes-
sor's funding requests by delving into the content of her research. 394 The
University could only restrict her academic freedom by fairly applying its
own procedural standards which did not allow any consideration of the sub-
stantive nature of a faculty member's work.3 95
VI. CONCLUSION
Many recent cases demonstrate the courts' negative response to attempted
enforcement of political correctness in public universities. Restrictive stu-
dent speech codes which prohibit offensive expressions or views have met
with firm resistance from the courts. When these codes could be used by
universities to suppress protected forms of speech, they have been struck
down as unconstitutional. University attempts to censor the expression of
views which some find disagreeable or offensive have been set back by these
court decisions, hopefully ending this unwise and distressing censorship of
student expression. In addition, attempts by universities to punish students
for expressing views not "approved" by the university or opinions which
certain student groups find "offensive" have not been tolerated by the courts.
Therefore, the legality of enforcing politically correct expression in public
universities, either through the enactment of restrictive student speech codes
or through selective prosecution of certain students, is very doubtful.
Unfortunately, at least for those who value free speech, private universi-
ties potentially have more "freedom" to censor student expression. How-
ever, many state constitutions provide guarantees to the right to free speech
which are applicable to both public and private universities. In addition,
Congress has indicated that it may pass laws preventing private universities
from suppressing free speech. Therefore, private universities may be equally
unable to force politically correct expression from its students.
Courts have also been willing to defend university faculty members' rights
to academic freedom and free expression. Colleges and universities attempt-
ing to impose politically correct ideologies on their faculty members have
been rebuked by the courts for trespassing on faculty members' constitu-
tional rights. Political correctness remains no more applicable to faculty
members than it is to students.
These court decisions only reinforce basic constitutional principles of the
right to free speech in our society. The enforcement of politically correct
expression is offensive to one's common sense as well as violative to the First
Amendment's very essence of freedom to speak your mind. University at-
tempts to enforce political correctness might be laughable if it were not for
the seriousness with which too many universities and their officials pursue
these censorship efforts. Regardless of the courts' complete rejection of at-
tempts to enforce politically correct expression, one wonders why any uni-





Students attend college to broaden their educational experience and to en-
hance their thinking ability. What lesson is learned if the university itself
engages in censorship and suppression of thought and expression? How can
faculty members teach if the university creates an environment where devia-
tion from officially accepted views will be met with denouncement and ex-
pulsion from their job? Universities must once again become defenders of
the right to free expression of one's opinions and viewpoints, no matter how
many others disagree with that view, instead of retaining their current role
as censurer, prohibiting the expression of certain views. Universities, as well
as society in general, should return to the principle that has served our coun-
try so well: the expression of competing and diverse views is healthy to our
society because it fosters a toleration for diversity as well as forcing us to
think about crucial issues of the day. Our society will be much improved
when we can once again recognize the value of freedom to speak one's views
instead of labeling people who disagree with us as racists, homophobes, lib-
erals, or sexists and attempting to silence them. Instead, we must learn to
first listen before condemning and shutting out all views that conflict with
our own. The university is a microcosm of society, and in that environment
students must be taught the value of diversity. If we abandon this idea, we
will not only have lost the foundation of our great educational institutions,
but we may also lose one of the very principles that holds our society to-
gether as one nation.
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